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ABSTRACT
Constructing advanced cryptographic applications often requires the ability of privately
embedding messages or functions in the code of a program. As an example, consider the
task of building a searchable encryption scheme, which allows the users to search over the
encrypted data and learn nothing other than the search result. Such a task is achievable if
it is possible to embed the secret key of an encryption scheme into the code of a program
that performs the “decrypt-then-search” functionality, and guarantee that the code hides
everything except its functionality.
This thesis studies two cryptographic primitives that facilitate the capability of hiding
secrets in the program of random functions.
1. We first study the notion of a private constrained pseudorandom function (PCPRF).
A PCPRF allows the PRF master secret key holder to derive a public constrained
key that changes the functionality of the original key without revealing the constraint
description. Such a notion closely captures the goal of privately embedding functions
in the code of a random function.
Our main contribution is in constructing single-key secure PCPRFs for NC1 circuit
constraints based on the learning with errors assumption. Single-key secure PCPRFs
were known to support a wide range of cryptographic applications, such as private-
key deniable encryption and watermarking. In addition, we build reusable garbled
circuits from PCPRFs.
2. We then study how to construct cryptographic hash functions that satisfy strong
random oracle-like properties. In particular, we focus on the notion of correlation
v
intractability, which requires that given the description of a function, it should be
hard to find an input-output pair that satisfies any sparse relations.
Correlation intractability captures the security properties required for, e.g., the sound-
ness of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where the Fiat-Shamir transformation is a practi-
cal method of building signature schemes from interactive proof protocols. However,
correlation intractability was shown to be impossible to achieve for certain length
parameters, and was widely considered to be unobtainable.
Our contribution is in building correlation intractable functions from various crypto-
graphic assumptions. The security analyses of the constructions use the techniques
of secretly embedding constraints in the code of random functions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Traditional cryptography protects the communication between parties who share the same
secret key that is used in both encryption and decryption. When our pioneers envisioned the
possibility of breaking the symmetry between the encryption and the decryption process,
they built public-key encryption schemes [81, 47, 92]. From a broader perspective, a good
public key can be viewed as a “restricted-access” form of the secret key that allows everyone
to perform the encryption operation, but forbids anyone except the secret key holder to
decrypt.
If we take a step further, suppose it is possible to take the secret key of a traditional
encryption scheme, modify it so as to support more general partial functionalities related
to encryption or decryption. At the same time, the code of the modified key is guaranteed
to reveal nothing beyond its functionality. Such a capability has tremendous cryptographic
implications.
As an example, consider the task of building a functional encryption scheme [70, 24].
In a functional encryption scheme, the master secret key holder is able to derive a function-
specific decryption key SKf for a function f . The functional decryption key SKf is expect
to output the value f(m) when applied on a ciphertext CTm of a message m, but reveal
nothing else.
Suppose we are able to take a normal encryption scheme and modify the code of its
decryption algorithm DecSK(·) according to the function f to get SKf , so that the modified
2key SKf computes the “decryption then evaluation” functionality
EvalSKf (CT) := f(DecSK(CT)),
and is guaranteed to hide everything else (especially the secret key SK). Then a functional
encryption scheme can be built by encrypting using the secret key SK, and taking SKf as
the functional decryption key.
More generally, suppose it is possible to take the code of an arbitrary program P and
produce its obfuscated form P˜ , so that P˜ computes the same functionality as P , and is
guaranteed to reveal nothing other than the functionality (or as little as possible) [71, 13].
Such a capability allows us to hide an important secret in the code of a program, e.g.,
the secret key in the program that computes the encryption functionality. Constructing a
general purpose obfuscator is considered one of the most challenging tasks in cryptography.
1.1 This thesis
This thesis aims at building new cryptographic primitives that facilitate the ability of
hiding secrets in the code of a program. In particular, our goal is to base the security of
the new primitives on the hardness of clean mathematical problems or abstractions. So
before showing the primitives we build, let me introduce a few mathematical objects or
abstractions and explain their relations to this thesis. They are lattices, multilinear maps,
and indistinguishability obfuscations.
Lattices in cryptography. In group theory, a lattice in Rn is a discrete subgroup of
Rn. In the use of lattices in cryptography, most of the applications are built upon
the following two lattice problems that are conjectured to be hard even for quantum
computers: the short integer solution (SIS) problem [2] and the learning with errors
(LWE) problem [91]. The problems themselves can be viewed as the short-vector
problem and the bounded distance decoding problem over random lattices, and are
3proved as hard as the short-vector problems over arbitrary high-dimensional lattices
in the worst case.
The hard lattice problems are extremely versatile in cryptography. They are behind
the constructions of powerful primitives, including attribute-based encryption (ABE)
[66] and fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) [55, 31]. The latter allows anyone to
compute on encrypted data without knowing the decryption key or learning the
underlying plaintext. The common feature of these applications is the use of both
the hardness and the homomorphism of the lattice problems. Our goal is to keep
exploring new properties of lattices to build new cryptographic primitives.
Multilinear maps in cryptography. Historically, multilinear maps (mmaps) were pro-
posed as an extension of bilinear maps [25], with a hope that mmaps can be built from
the algebraic geometric approaches, like the bilinear maps were [84]. Interestingly,
all the existing candidate multilinear maps [52, 46, 56] follow the blueprint of the
existing lattice-based FHE schemes. So I will define multilinear maps through the
lens of their concrete realizations, instead of going through bilinear maps. Namely,
we can think of multilinear maps as “FHE schemes with equality tests”. Over the
encrypted messages, the evaluator is allowed to perform homomorphic operations,
and test whether two ciphertexts encode the same messages. Ideally, the messages
are supposed to be hidden, up to the leakage from the addition, multiplication, and
equivalence-test operations.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation. Obfuscation can certainly be viewed as a crypto-
graphic application. In this thesis we would also like to think of obfuscation as an
abstraction to assist the construction of other applications. Indeed, if there were
an obfuscator that is guaranteed to produce a program that literally reveals nothing
other than the functionality, then hiding secrets in any program is achievable straight-
forwardly. However, such an ideal notion of obfuscation has been proven impossible
to obtain [71, 13].
4Instead, we work with indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which requires that the
obfuscated code of two programs are indistinguishable, as long as the two programs
compute the same functionality [13]. Such a notion is not ruled out by the impos-
sibility results of [71, 13]. In fact, the first iO candidate is proposed in 2013 based
on the existence of secure multilinear maps [53]. Note that the definition of iO does
not immediately guarantee to hide the secrets in the obfuscated code. Nevertheless,
with the techniques developed by Sahai and Waters [93], iO is known to be powerful
enough to support many capabilities in cryptography that are otherwise unreachable.
For example, a full-fledged functional encryption scheme can be built from iO [53, 95].
Overall, as cryptographic abstractions, multilinear maps and iO are more powerful
than the lattices problems, in the sense that building a scheme from the former is much
easier than from the latter. However, at the time when the thesis is being written, all the
existing iO schemes are based on the conjectured security of the multilinear maps, and all
the multilinear maps candidates are built from the non-standard use of lattice problems.
More explicitly, breaking the mmaps candidates does not necessary imply an attack on the
short-vector problems, unlike the leveled homomorphic encryption schemes, where breaking
the schemes means breaking LWE. In fact, the candidate mmaps (and consequently, the
candidate obfuscators) are broken in several settings by the attacks launched since the
work of [43].
So for the problems tackled in this dissertation, we typically use the following method-
ology: First try to accomplish the task using multilinear maps or iO, then try to base it
directly on the better understood hardness assumptions, like the conjectured hardness of
the lattice problems, possibly using the ideas from the mmaps and iO literature.
We also narrow the scope of the problem from hiding secrets in the code of an arbitrary
program, to hiding secrets in the code of a pseudorandom function (PRF). In cryptography,
a family of functions is called pseudorandom, if for any computationally bounded adversary,
a random function from the family is indistinguishable from a truly random function given
5black-box access [60]. Given that PRFs behave randomly, focusing on the encoded forms
of PRFs brings both challenges and opportunities. At a first glance, building applications
with non-random functionalities from encoded pseudorandom functions seems to require
extra work. However, PRFs are known to support the basic cryptographic operations
such as encryption and decryption, so we have some confidence in obtaining expressive
functionalities from the capability of hiding secrets in the code of PRFs.
1.2 On private constrained pseudorandom functions
We start by investigating the notion of a private constrained PRF (PCPRF), which closely
capture the functionality of privately embedding functions in a cryptographic key. In a
constrained PRF [26, 76, 28], given a constraint predicate C, the PRF master secret key
holder is able to derive a public constrained key CKC that changes the evaluation result
on every input x s.t. C(x) = 0, while preserving the functionality on every input x s.t.
C(x) = 1. A private constrained PRF further requires the constraint C to be hidden in
the code of the constrained key CKC [23].
Private constrained PRFs (and their close variants) have a wide range of applications,
including searchable encryption and watermarking [23]. The power of a private constrained
PRF mainly comes from its constraint-hiding property, so as to support applications that
a normal constrained PRF does not. As a result, constructing a private constrained PRF
is more difficult than constructing a plain constrained PRF. The difficulty already arises
with the simplest type of constraint, which changes the evaluation result on one input, and
preserves the functionality elsewhere (constrained PRFs that handle the point constraints
of this kind are also called puncturable PRFs [93]). While plain puncturable PRFs can
be constructed from one-way functions [60, 26, 76, 28], candidates for private puncturbale
PRFs were only proposed (in [23]) based on the existence of iO or secure multilinear maps.
In joint work with Ran Canetti [35], we construct a single-key secure PCPRF for all
constraints recognizable by logarithmic depth circuits (NC1) based on the learning with
6errors assumption [91].
Informal Theorem 1.1. Assuming the intractability of LWE, there exists a PCPRF for
all constraints recognizable by NC1 circuits.
Single-key PCPRFs are expressive enough to support many applications [23]. In addi-
tion, we show that PCPRFs can be used to construct private-key functional encryption with
function-privacy (a.k.a. reusable garbled circuits). Although Goldwasser et al. [61] have
already constructed reusable garbled circuits from LWE, their construction goes through
the lattice-based ABE, FHE, and is quite complicated. Our construction is simple and
directly follows the blueprint outlined in the first page of the introduction.
Informal Theorem 1.2. For a circuit class C, assuming the existence of a single-key secure
PCPRF for constraints in C, and CPA secure private-key encryption whose decryption
circuit is in C, there exist reusable garbled circuits for C.
Our PCPRF construction combines the candidate multilinear maps and obfuscator by
Gentry, Gorbunov, and Halevi [56] (henceforth GGH15), and the lattice-based PRFs of
Banerjee, Peikert, and Rosen [11]. The heart of our technical contribution is in identifying
a “safe mode” the GGH15 encodings, whose security can be based on LWE. Previously,
the security properties of GGH15-based applications are largely unclear, some are indeed
broken after extensive cryptanalyses [45, 41].
Before and after our work on PCPRF [35], similar “safe modes” of GGH15 are discov-
ered with the motivation of building special-purpose obfuscators in [33, 68, 96]. One of the
common ideas used in these constructions is to embed permutation branching program in
the LWE secrets. While permutation branching programs are expressive enough, they can
be awkwardly complicated when used to express simple functions.
In joint work with Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Hoeteck Wee [42], we propose the gen-
eralized GGH15 framework, which covers the use of GGH15 in conjunction with general
(non-permutation) matrix branching programs. We develop new methodologies in analyz-
ing GGH15 and the lattice trapdoor sampling algorithms [58]. The new frameworks and
7proof methodologies yield, among others, a private puncturable PRF from LWE that uses
read-once branching programs, which significantly simplifies the construction from [35].
1.3 On correlation intractability
We then tackle to the problem of constructing correlation intractable hash functions.
Roughly speaking, a family of hash functions is correlation intractable if it is hard to find,
given a random function in the family, an input-output pair that satisfies any “sparse”
relation, namely any relation that is hard to satisfy for truly random functions.
Correlation intractability captures a strong and natural Random Oracle-like property.
The notion is known to be related to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [51], which is a practical
method of obtaining non-interactive argument protocols (or efficient signatures) from in-
teractive proof or argument systems. However, for both correlation intractability and the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic, achieving these notions was widely considered impossible (at least
in theory) [38, 62]. Furthermore, no candidate constructions had been proposed in the
literature for any setting of the parameters. So identifying a setting where these notions
are achievable, and basing them on established cryptographic assumption are considered
important open problems.
In joint work with Ran Canetti and Leonid Reyzin [36], we construct a correlation in-
tractable function ensemble that withstands all relations with a priori bounded polynomial
complexity. The construction is indistinguishability obfuscation of puncturable pseudoran-
dom functions. This is the first feasibility result for correlation intractability.
Informal Theorem 1.3. Assume the existence of input-hiding obfuscation for evasive
circuits, subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, and subexponentially se-
cure puncturable pseudorandom functions. Then for any polynomial p(·), there is a p(·)-
bounded correlation intractable function ensemble.
Despite being the first feasibility result, Theorem 1.3 has several shortcomings. First,
it only covers polynomially bounded relations, so it does not imply the soundness of the
8Fiat-Shamir heuristic applied on interactive proofs (which requires correlation intractability
w.r.t. unbound relations). Secondly, the construction uses iO, which is by itself a strong
assumption, and is far from being efficient.
In joint work with Ran Canetti, Leonid Reyzin, and Ron D. Rothblum [37], we fur-
ther construct correlation intractable hash functions for arbitrary binary sparse relations.
Such a result implies the soundness of Fiat-Shamir applied on interactive proof protocols.
Our construction uses an encryption scheme that satisfies certain statistical properties and
guarantees exponentially strong key-dependent message (KDM) security against polyno-
mial time key-recovery attacks. In addition, we show that variants of ElGamal encryption
[50] and Regev encryption [91] satisfy the universal ciphertext property and plausibly sat-
isfy the foregoing exponential security against KDM key recovery. These assumptions are
still incomparable with the ones in Theorem 1.3, but they are more concrete and easier to
cryptanalyze. The resulting hash functions are very simple.
Informal Theorem 1.4. Assume the existence of exponentially KDM secure encryp-
tion schemes with universal ciphertexts. Then there is a correlation intractable function
ensemble for any sparse relations.
1.4 Reader’s guide to the thesis
This thesis is mainly based on the following papers.
1. Ran Canetti, Yilei Chen, and Leonid Reyzin. On the Correlation Intractability of
Obfuscated Pseudorandom Functions. In 13th Theory of Cryptography Conference
— TCC 2016-A.
2. Ran Canetti, and Yilei Chen. Constraint-Hiding Constrained PRFs for NC1 from
LWE. In 36th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques — EUROCRYPT 2017.
3. Ran Canetti, Yilei Chen, Leonid Reyzin, and Ron D. Rothblum. Fiat-Shamir and
9Correlation Intractability from Strong KDM-Secure Encryption. In 37th Annual In-
ternational Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
— EUROCRYPT 2018.
4. Yilei Chen, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Hoeteck Wee. GGH15 Beyond Permutation
Branching Programs. In submission for publication, 2018.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapters 2 to 6 provide the background required for the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2
provides preliminaries. Chapter 3 provides the definitions of pseudorandom functions
(PRF), constrained PRFs, then defines private constrained PRFs and discusses their
relations to obfuscation and functional encryption (based on [35]). Chapter 4 gives
the background on lattices. Chapter 5 surveys the existing PRFs that are relevant
to the main constructions in this thesis. Chapter 6 provides terminologies for matrix
branching programs.
• Chapters 7 to 12 provide constructions of private constrained PRFs and private pro-
grammable PRFs, and the underlying generalized GGH15 framework. They are based
on [35] and [42]. A detailed overview of these chapters can be found in Chapter 7.
• Chapters 13 to 16 focus on correlation intractability based on [36] and [37]. We start
from the definition in Chapter 13, then provide an overview of our constructions in
Chapter 14, then give the details in Chapters 15 and 16.
• Chapter 17 mentions a few open problems.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and terminology
Let R,Z,N be the set of real numbers, integers and positive integers. Denote Z/(qZ) by Zq.
The rounding operation baep : Zq → Zp is defined as multiplying a by p/q and rounding the
result to the nearest integer. A real function f on a set X is defined as f(X) =
∑
x∈X f(x).
For n ∈ N, [n] := {1, ..., n}. A vector in Rn (represented in column form by default) is
written as a bold lower-case letter, e.g. v. For a vector v, the ith component of v will be
denoted by vi. A matrix is written as a bold capital letter, e.g. A. The i
th column vector
of A is denoted ai. One of the exception is the notation of the j
th unit vector ej ; i.e., for
an integer w, ej ∈ {0, 1}1×w denotes the unit vector with the jth coordinate being 1, the
rest being 0.
The length of a vector is the `p-norm ‖v‖p = (
∑
vpi )
1/p. The length of a matrix is
the norm of its longest column: ‖A‖p = maxi ‖ai‖p. By default we use `2-norm unless
explicitly mentioned. When a vector or matrix is called “small”, we refer to its norm. The
thresholds of “small” will be precisely parameterized in the article and are not necessary
negligible functions.
Subset products (of matrices) appear frequently in this article. For a given h ∈ N, a
bit-string v ∈ {0, 1}h, we use Xv to denote
∏
i∈[h] Xi,vi (it is implicit that {Xi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
have been defined).
The tensor product (Kronecker product) for matrices A ∈ R`×m, B ∈ Rn×p is defined
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as
A⊗B =

a1,1B, . . . , a1,mB
. . . , . . . , . . .
a`,1B, . . . , a`,mB
 ∈ R`n×mp. (2.1)
For matrices A ∈ R`×m, B ∈ Rn×p, C ∈ Rm×u, D ∈ Rp×v,
(AC)⊗ (BD) = (A⊗B) · (C⊗D). (2.2)
2.2 Cryptographic notions
In cryptography, the security parameter (denoted as λ) is a variable that is used to pa-
rameterize the computational complexity of the cryptographic algorithm or protocol, and
the adversary’s probability of breaking security. An algorithm is “efficient” if it runs in
(probabilistic) polynomial time over λ.
Many experiments and probability statements in this paper contain randomized algo-
rithms. When a variable v is drawn randomly from the set S we denote as v
$← S or
v ← U(S), sometimes abbreviated as v when the context is clear.
A function ensemble F has a key generation function g : S → K; on a seed s ∈ S(λ), g
produces a key k ∈ K(λ) for a function with domain D(λ) and range C(λ):
F = {fk : D(λ)→ C(λ), k = g(s), s ∈ S(λ)}λ∈N
For certain key generation algorithm g, the seed s can be efficiently recovered from the
key k. We call such functions public-coin.
Let X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N be two ensembles. We define their statistical and
computational distance.
Definition 2.1. Let U be the range of X and Y . The statistical distance between X and
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Y is defined as
∆s(X,Y ) :=
1
2
∑
u∈U
|Pr[X = u]− Pr[Y = u]| .
X, Y are called statistically close (or X ≈s Y ) if their statistical distance ∆(X,Y ) is
negligible in λ.
Definition 2.2. For an algorithm A running in time T (·), the computational advantage
of A in distinguishing X and Y is defined as
∆c(X,Y ) :=
∣∣∣∣ Pru←X[A(u) = 1]− Pru←Y [A(u) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
X, Y are called computationally indistinguishable (or X ≈c Y ) if for all probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm A, for all polynomial p(·), for sufficiently large λ, ∆c(Xλ, Yλ) <
1/p(λ).
Lemma 2.3 (Leftover hash lemma). Let H = {h : X → Y} be a 2-universal hash function
family. Then for any random variable X ∈ X , for  > 0 s.t. log(|Y|) ≤ H∞(X)−2 log(1/),
the distributions
(h, h(X)) and (h, U(Y))
are -statistically close.
Definition 2.4 (One-way function). A function f : D → C is called one-way if it is
1. Easy to compute: There is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm A such that
for all x ∈ D, A(x) = f(x).
2. Hard to invert: for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A′, for any polyno-
mial p, for sufficiently large λ,
Pr
x∈Dλ
[A′(1λ, f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] < 1/p(λ).
Definition 2.5 (Pseudorandom generator). A deterministic function g : {0, 1}`(λ) →
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{0, 1}m(λ) is called a pseudorandom generator (PRG) if `(λ) < m(λ), and g(U({0, 1}`(λ))) ≈c
U({0, 1}m(λ)).
Lemma 2.6 ([73]). Pseudorandom generator exists if and only if one-way function exists.
2.3 Program obfuscation
A program obfuscator is a compiler that takes as input a plaintext program P , outputs a
program P˜ that preserves the functionality of P , while makeing the program unintelligible.
Definition 2.7 (Functionality of an obfuscator [71, 13]). A probabilistic algorithm O is
an obfuscator for a class of circuit C if it satisfies the following functionality requirements.
• (Functionality preservation) For all inputs x, Pr[C(x) = O(C(x))] > 1− negl(λ).
• (Polynomially slowdown) There is a polynomial B s.t. |O(C)| < B(|C|).
Here are the security notions commonly used in the literature.
Definition 2.8 (Strong Virtual-Black-Box Obfuscation [71, 13]). A probabilistic algorithm
O is called a strong virtual black-box obfuscator for a class of circuit C if for any p.p.t.
adversary Adv, there is a p.p.t. simulator Sim s.t. for all C,
{
Adv(1λ, O(C))
}
≈c
{
SimC(·)(1λ, |C|)
}
.
Definition 2.9 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation [13]). A probabilistic algorithm O is an
indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO) for a class of circuit C if for any feasible adversary Adv,
there is a negligible function negl(·) such that for all circuits C0 and C1 that have identical
functionalities, and are of the same size, it holds that
|Pr[Adv(O(C0)) = 1]− Pr[Adv(O(f1)) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).
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Definition 2.10 (Evasive circuit collections). Let C = {Ck : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N
be a circuit collection, we say Cλ is evasive if there is a negligible function negl(·) such that
for all x ∈ {0, 1}`(λ):
Pr
k
[Ck(x) 6= 0m(λ)] ≤ negl(λ)
Definition 2.11 (Input-hiding Obfuscation for evasive circuits [12]). An obfuscator for a
evasive circuit collection C is input-hiding (IHO) if for every p.p.t. adversary Adv there
exist a negligible function negl(·) s.t. for every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ):
Pr
k
[Ck(Adv(IHO(Ck), z)) 6= 0m(λ)] ≤ negl(λ)
For the definition presented above, it is implicit that the evasive circuit Ck is picked
independently from the auxiliary input z. If z is allowed to depend on Ck, then input-hiding
is unachievable for some z [12].
Chapter 3
Defining Pseudorandom Functions, Constrained,
Privately
This chapter provides the definitions of pseudorandom function (PRF), constrained PRF,
and private constrained PRF.
Definition 3.1 (Pseudorandom function [60]). A family of deterministic functions F =
{Fk : Dλ → Rλ}λ∈N is pseudorandom if there exists a negligible function negl(·) for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary Adv, such that
∣∣∣∣ Prk,Adv[AdvFk(·)(1λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣ PrO,Adv[AdvO(·)(1λ) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ),
where O(·) denotes a truly random function.
3.1 Defining a constrained PRF
We first recall the definition of a constrained PRF from [26].
Definition 3.2 (Constrained PRF [26]). A family of functions F = {F : Dλ → Rλ}λ∈N is
specified by a tuple of efficient functions (Gen, Constrain, Eval, Constrain.Eval). For a class
of constraints C = {Cλ : Dλ → {0, 1}}λ∈N,
• The key generation algorithm Gen(1λ, Cλ) takes the security parameter λ, and the
description of the constraint class Cλ, generates the master secret key MSK.
• The evaluation algorithm Eval(MSK, x) takes MSK, an input x, outputs FMSK(x).
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• The constraining algorithm Constrain(1λ,MSK, C) takes MSK, a constraint C, out-
puts the constrained key CKC .
• The constrained evaluation algorithm Constrain.Eval(CKC , x) takes a constrained key
CKC , an input x, outputs FCKC (x).
F is a constrained PRF for C if it satisfies the following properties:
Functionality preservation over unconstrained points. For input x ∈ Dλ s.t.
C(x) = 1,
Pr[Eval(MSK, x) = Eval(CK, x)] ≥ 1− negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness in algorithms Gen and Constrain.
Pseudorandomness on the constrained points. Consider the following exper-
iment between a challenger and an adversary. The adversary can ask 3 types of oracle
queries: constrained key oracle, evaluation oracle, and challenge oracle. For b ∈ {0, 1}, the
challenger responds to each oracle query in the following manner:
• Constrained key oracle. Given a circuit C ∈ C, the challenger outputs a constrained
key CK← Constrain(1λ,MSK, C).
• Evaluation oracle. Given an input x ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs y ← Eval(MSK, x).
• Challenge oracle. Given an input xc ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs y ← Eval(MSK, xc)
if b = 1; outputs y ← U(Rλ) if b = 0.
The challenge query xc from the adversary satisfies the conditions that C(xc) = 0, and xc
is not sent among evaluation queries. At the end of the experiment, the adversary chooses
b′ and wins if b′ = b. The scheme satisfies the pseudorandomness property if the winning
probability of any p.p.t. adversary is bounded by 1/2 + negl(λ).
One may also consider the definition where the multiple inputs are queried in the
challenge oracle. As was mentioned in [26], the definition with single input challenge
query (along with polynomially many input evaluation queries) implies the definition with
multiple input challenge queries.
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Definition 3.3 (Puncturable PRF [26, 93]). A puncturable PRF is a type of constrained
PRF where the constraint class is Cλ = {Cx∗}x∗∈Dλ , where Cx∗(x) =

1 if x 6= x∗
0 if x = x∗
.
A punctured key k on point x∗ is typically denoted as k {x∗}.
3.2 The indistinguishability-based definition of a PCPRF
The indistinguishability-based definition of PCPRF from [23] is composed of the basic
gadget for constrained PRF [26] plus the constraint-hiding requirement.
Definition 3.4 (Indistinguishability-based Private Constrained PRF [23]). A family of
functions F is an indistinguishability-secure PCPRF for C if it satisfies Definition 3.2, and
the following property:
Indistinguishability-based constraint-hiding. Consider the following experiment
between a challenger and an adversary. The adversary can ask 2 types of oracle queries:
constrained key oracle or evaluation oracle. For b ∈ {0, 1}, the challenger responds to each
oracle query in the following manner:
• Constrained key oracle. Given a pair of circuits C0, C1 ∈ C, the challenger outputs a
constrained key for Cb: CK← Constrain(1λ,MSK, Cb).
• Evaluation oracle. Given an input x ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs y ← Eval(MSK, x).
For a circuit C ∈ C, denote S(C) := {x ∈ Dλ : C(x) = 1}. Suppose the adversary asks h
pairs of circuit constraints
{
C
(g)
0 , C
(g)
1
}
g∈[h]
, the queries are admissible if (1) ∀i 6= j ∈ [h],
S(C
(i)
0 )∩ S(C(j)0 ) = S(C(i)1 )∩ S(C(j)1 ); (2) for all input evaluation queries x, for all g ∈ [h],
C
(g)
0 (x) = C
(g)
1 (x).
At the end of the experiment, the adversary chooses b′ and wins if b′ = b. The scheme
satisfies the constraint-hiding property if the winning probability of any p.p.t. adversary
is bounded by 1/2 + negl(λ).
18
3.3 The simulation-based definition
Next we give the simulation-based definition. We first present a definition that is central
to the discussions and constructions in the paper, then mention its variants.
Definition 3.5 (Simulation-based PCPRF). A family of functions F is a simulation-
secure PCPRF for C if it satisfies the functionality requirements in Definition 3.2, and for
any polytime stateful algorithm Adv, there is a polytime stateful algorithm Sim such that:
{
Experiment REALAdv(1
λ)
}
λ∈N
≈c
{
Experiment IDEALAdv,Sim(1
λ)
}
λ∈N
.
The ideal and real experiments are defined as follows for the algorithms Adv and Sim:
Experiment REALAdv(1
λ) Experiment IDEALAdv,Sim(1
λ)
MSK← Gen(1λ), Sim← 1λ
Repeat : Repeat :
Adv→ (x, dx); y = Eval(MSK, x) Adv→ (x, dx); y = Sim(x, dx)
Adv← y if dx = 0 then y = U(R);Adv← y
Adv→ C; Adv→ C;
if dx 6= C(x) for some x then Output ⊥ if dx 6= C(x) for some x then Output ⊥
else Adv ← Constrain(MSK, C) else Adv← Sim(1|C|)
Repeat : Repeat :
Adv→ x; y = Eval(MSK, x) Adv→ x; y = Sim(x,C(x))
Adv← y if C(x) = 0 then y = U(R);Adv← y
Adv→ b; Output b Adv→ b; Output b
That is, in the experiments the adversary can ask a single constraint query and polynomially
many input queries, in any order. For input queries x made before the circuit query, Adv
is expected to provide a bit dx indicating whether C(x) = 1. In the real experiment Adv
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obtains the unconstrained function value at x. In the ideal experiment Sim learns the
indicator bit dx; if dx = 1 then Adv gets a value generated by Sim, and if dx = 0 then Adv
obtains a random value from the range R of the function. Once Adv makes the constraint
query C ∈ Cλ, both experiments verify the consistency of the indicator bits dx for all the
inputs x queried by Adv so far. If any inconsistency is found then the experiment halts.
Next, in the real experiment Adv obtains the constrained key generated by the con-
straining algorithm; in the ideal experiment Adv obtains a key generated by Sim, whereas
Sim is given only the size of C. The handling of input queries made by Adv after the circuit
query is similar to the ones before, with the exception that the indicator bit dx is no longer
needed and Sim obtains the value of C(x) instead. The output of the experiment is the
final output bit of Adv.
Remark 3.6. One may consider a stronger definition than Definition 3.5 where the adver-
sary is not required to provide the indicator bits dx in the queries prior to providing the
constraint. However, the stronger definition is unachievable if the number of input queries
before the constraint query is unbounded, due to an “incompressibility” argument similar
to the one from [1] in the context of functional encryption.
Definition 3.7 (Selective security). A function ensemble F is a selective simulation-secure
PCPRF if the adversary in the experiments of Definition 3.2 sends all the constraint and
input queries at once.
The simulation-based definition can be generalized to the setting where the adversary
queries multiple constrained keys. We present some natural generalizations, and discuss
the possibility of achieving them shortly.
Definition 3.8 (Multiple-key simulation security). A function ensemble F is an h-key
simulation-secure PCPRF if the adversary in the experiments of Definition 3.2 can send
h constrained key queries {Cj}j∈[h]. The simulator’s inputs are changed as follows: on an
input query x, the simulator receives x and indicators {Cj(x)}j∈[h]; on a constraint query
for Cj , the simulator only receives the description length of Cj .
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Note that Definition 3.8 is unachievable when the adversary does not make evaluation
queries. This is so since the view of the simulator is independent of whether the two
constraints agree on some known input value (say, 1), so there is no hope of providing
meaningful simulation.
Below we consider a weaker variant of the multi-key simulation security, where the
simulator is given oracle access to the constrained circuits.
Definition 3.9 (Multiple-key weak simulation security). A function ensemble F is an h-
key weakly simulation-secure PCPRF if in addition to Definition 3.8, the simulator has
oracle access to the circuits {Cj}j∈[h].
3.4 An alternative view of the definition
I would like to provide an alternative view of the definition of a private constrained PRF.
Starting from a basic function f0, the encoding of f0 is required to be indistinguishable
from the encoding of f0 + ∆, where ∆ represents some shift function. This view is taken
in the work of Peikert and Shiehian in terms of “shift-hiding shift function” [90].
One more step further, we can define a private function combiner in the following sense.
We think of f0 and f1 as the “basic” functions. Private function combiner requires that
for any constraint predicate C, an encoding of the function fC(x)(x) is indistinguishable
from the encoding of f0. Such a definition is possibly satisfiable for a larger class of basic
functions (i.e. not only for PRFs). In fact, if the pseudorandomness of the input evaluations
are not required in the original PCPRF definition, then the definition makes sense even
when the underlying function is not a PRF, and still suffices for many applications to be
discussed later.
3.5 Two-key secure PCPRFs imply obfuscators
We show that the weakly simulation-based PCPRF for two keys implies the strong virtual
black-box obfuscation notion of [71] which is impossible to obtain for certain functionali-
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ties. For the indistinguishability-based definition proposed in [23], achieving 2-key security
implies indistinguishability obfuscation [13].
Construction 3.10 (Obfuscator from 2-key PCPRFs). Given a PCPRF, we construct an
obfuscator for C by create a constrained key CK[C], and a constrained key CK[I] where
I is the circuit that always outputs 1. To evaluate C(x), output 1 if PCPRFCK[C](x) =
PCPRFCK[I](x), 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.11. If 2-key weakly simulation-secure PCPRF from Definition 3.9 exists for
circuit class C, then Construction 3.10 is a strong VBB obfuscation for circuit class C.
Proof. The simulator for the VBB obfuscator SimVBB runs the simulator for PCPRF SimF .
Once SimF makes indicator queries on x, SimVBB queries its circuit oracle C(·) on x,
sends the indicators C(x), 1 to SimF . SimF outputs simulated constraint keys CK
S [C],
CKS [I], which are indistinguishable from the real constrained keys CK[C], CK[I] used in
the obfuscator.
Corollary 3.12 ([71, 13]). 2-key weakly simulation-secure PCPRF is impossible to obtain
for certain constraints.
Theorem 3.13. If 2-key indistinguishability-based PCPRF exists for circuit class C, then
Construction 3.10 is an indistinguishability obfuscator for circuit class C.
Proof. For a circuit C, the obfuscator outputs CK[C], CK[I]. For functionally equivalent
circuits C0 and C1, S(C0)∩S(I) = S(C1)∩S(I). By indistinguishability constraint-hiding,
(CK[C0],CK[I]) ≈c (CK[C1],CK[I]).
3.6 The relation between the simulation and ind-based definitions
Next we discuss the relation of the simulation and indistinguishability-based definitions
for PCPRF, under the single-key setting. Below we state the theorems for the selective
versions of the definitions.
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Theorem 3.14. If a PCPRF satisfies the selective simulation-based definition, then it
satisfies the selective indistinguishability-based definition.
Proof. Correctness follows directly from the simulation-based definition. For constraint-
hiding, we prove by a hybrid argument, that the constrained key for either C0 or C1 is
indistinguishable from an intermediate simulated constrained key. Formally, for PCPRF
F , suppose there is an distinguisher D that violates Definition 3.4, we build a distinguisher
D′ between the real and simulated distributions in Definition 3.2. For circuits C0, C1 and
input queries
{
x(k)
}
k∈[t] that are admissible for Definition 3.4, for b ∈ {0, 1}, D′ obtains
the constrained keys and outputs either from the real Rb := (CK[Cb],
{
x(k), y(k)
}
k∈[t]) or
the simulated distribution S := (CK[CS ],{x(k), y(k)S}
k∈[t]), send it to D. Given that D is
able to distinguish R0 from R1 with non-negligible advantage, D is also able to distinguish
(at least) one of Rb from S with non-negligible advantage, b ∈ {0, 1}.
Pseudorandomness of the constrained outputs can be shown via a similar hybrid argu-
ment.
Theorem 3.15. If a PCPRF satisfies 1-key selective indistinguishability-based definition,
it satisfies the 1-key selective simulation-based definition.
Proof. For a PCPRF F that satisfies Definition 3.4 for one constrained key query, we
construct a simulator as per Definition 3.2. The simulator picks an all-1 circuit CS = I
such that I(x) = 1,∀x ∈ Dλ, and use the indistinguishability-secure constraining algorithm
to derive a constrained key CKS for CS . Once the simulator obtains the inputs and the
indicators
{
x(k), d(k)
}
k∈[t], if d
(k) = 1, outputs Eval(CKS , x(k)); if d(k) = 0, outputs y ←
U(Rλ).
We first prove constraint-hiding. Suppose there is an adversary A′ that distinguishes
the simulated distribution from the real distribution, we build an adversary A that breaks
the indistinguishability definition for F . A sends constrained circuit queries C0 = C and
C1 = I, obtains CK[Cb]. Then A sends input queries. For x
(k) s.t. C(x(k)) = I(x(k)) = 1,
the output is Eval(CK[Cb], x
(k)); for x(k) s.t. C(x(k)) 6= I(x(k)), it is an inadmissible query
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so A samples an uniform random output on its own. Then A forwards CK[Cb], inputs and
outputs to A′. The choice of A′ for the real or the simulated distribution corresponds to
b = 0 or 1, hence the advantage of A is equivalent to A′.
Next we prove pseudorandomness on the constrained inputs. For input x such that
C(x) = 0, suppose there is an adversary A′ that distinguishes the simulated output (which
is uniformly random) from the real output, we build an adversary A that breaks the
indistinguishability-based pseudorandomness property on the challenge input for F . The
reduction is the same as one above except that the adversary A forwards the challenge
output as the reply of one of the real or simulated output. The choice of A′ for the real or
the simulated distribution corresponds to b = 0 or 1, hence the advantage of A is equivalent
to A′.
3.7 Single-key secure PCPRF implies reusable garbled circuits
We show that private-key function-hiding functional encryptions (a.k.a. reusable garbled
circuits [61]) are implied by private constrained PRFs.
Definition 3.16 ( Function-hiding functional encryptions (reusable garbled circuits [61])
). A functional encryption scheme for a class of functions Cµ = {C : {0, 1}µ → {0, 1}} is a
tuple of p.p.t. algorithms (Setup,FSKGen,Enc,Dec) such that:
• Setup(1λ) takes as input the security parameter 1λ, outputs the master secret key
MSK.
• FSKGen(MSK, C) takes MSK and a function C ∈ Cµ, outputs a functional decryption
key FSKC .
• Enc(MSK,m) takes MSK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}µ, outputs a ciphertext CTm.
• Dec(FSKC ,CTm) takes as input a ciphertext CTm and a functional decryption key
FSKC , outputs (in the clear) the result C(m) of applying the function on the message.
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We require that:
Correctness. For every message m ∈ {0, 1}µ and function C ∈ Cµ we have:
Pr[Dec(FSKC ,Enc(MSK,m)) = C(m)] = 1− negl(λ).
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithms Setup,FSKGen,Enc,Dec.
Security. We require that for all polytime, stateful algorithm Adv, there is a polytime,
stateful algorithm Sim such that:
{
Experiment REALAdv(1
λ)
}
λ∈N
≈c
{
Experiment IDEALAdv,Sim(1
λ)
}
λ∈N
The real and ideal experiments of stateful algorithms Adv,Sim are as follow:
Experiment REALAdv(1
λ) Experiment IDEALAdv,Sim(1
λ)
MSK← Gen(1λ), Sim← 1λ
Repeat : Repeat :
Adv→ (m, dm); Adv← Enc(MSK,m); Adv→ (m, dm); Adv← Sim(1|m|, dm);
Adv→ C; Adv→ C;
if dm 6= C(m)for some m then Output ⊥ if dm 6= C(m)for some m then Output ⊥
else Adv← FSKC = FSKGen(MSK, C); else Adv← FSKS = Sim(1|C|);
Repeat : Repeat :
Adv→ m; Adv← Enc(MSK,m) Adv→ m; Adv← Sim(1|m|, C(m))
Adv→ b; Output b Adv→ b; Output b
That is, in the experiments Adv can ask for a single functional decryption key and poly-
nomially many input queries, in any order. For encryption queries m made before the
decryption key query, Adv is expected to provide a bit dx indicating whether C(m) = 1. In
the real experiment Adv obtains the encryption of m. In the ideal experiment Adv obtains
a value generated by Sim, whereas Sim is given only 1|m| and dm. Once Adv makes the
functional key query for circuit C ∈ Cλ, both experiments verify the consistency of the in-
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dicator bits dm for all the encryption queries m made by Adv so far. If any inconsistency is
found then the experiment halts. Next, in the real experiment Adv obtains the constrained
key generated by the constraining algorithm; in the ideal experiment Adv obtains a key
generated by Sim, whereas Sim is given only the size of C. The handling of encryption
queries made by Adv after the circuit query is similar to the ones before, with the exception
that the indicator bit dm is no longer needed and Sim obtains the value of C(m) instead.
The output of the experiment is the final output bit of Adv.
The definition of symmetric-key encryption schemes with semantic security [64] then
falls into a special case of Definition 3.16 by requiring that (1) the function class C is the
identity function; (2) the functional-decryption key is never given to the adversary.
Theorem 3.17. If there are 1-key secure private constrained PRFs for constraint class C,
and symmetric-key encryption schemes with decryption in the class C, then there are 1-key
secure private-key function-hiding functional encryptions for function class C.
Construction 3.18. Given a PCPRF (F.Gen,F.Constrain,F.Eval), a symmetric-key en-
cryption scheme (Sym.Gen,Sym.Enc, Sym.Dec) that is semantically secure, we build a private-
key functional encryption FE as follows:
• FE.Setup(1λ) takes as input the security parameter 1λ, runs Sym.Gen(1λ)→ Sym.SK,
F.Gen(1λ)→ F.MSK, outputs the master secret key FE.MSK = (Sym.SK,F.MSK).
• FE.Enc(FE.MSK,m) parses FE.MSK = (Sym.SK,F.MSK), computes
Sym.CT = Sym.Enc(m), Tag = F.Eval(F.MSK,Sym.CT).
Outputs FE.CT = (Sym.CT,Tag).
• FE.FSKGen(FE.MSK, C) parses FE.MSK = (Sym.SK,F.MSK), outputs the functional
decryption key FE.FSKC = F.Constrain(F.MSK, F [Sym.SK, C]), where the functional-
ity of F [Sym.SK, C](·) is:
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– On input x, computes Sym.Dec(Sym.SK, x)→ m ∈ {0, 1}µ ∩ ⊥;
– if m = ⊥, return 0; else, return C(m).
• FE.Dec(FE.FSKC ,FE.CT) parses FE.FSKC = F.CKF , FE.CT = (Sym.CT,Tag), com-
putes T = F.Eval(F.CKF , Sym.CT). Outputs 1 if T = Tag, 0 if not.
Correctness. Correctness follows the correctness of Sym and F.
Proof. We build the FE simulator FE.Sim from the symmetric-key encryption simulator
Sym.Sim and PCPRF simulator F.Sim:
1. Generates the simulated master secret-keys Sym.SKS and F.MSKS
2. Given a function-decryption key query (for function C), FE.Sim runs
CKS ← F.Sim1(1λ, 1|F [Sym.SK,C]|, F.MSKS),
outputs CKS as FE.FSKS .
3. Given a ciphertext query and the output bit C(m), FE.Sim runs
Sym.CTS ← Sym.Sim(1λ, 1|m|,Sym.SKS),
TagS ← FSim2(F.MSKS ,CKS , Sym.CTS , C(m)),
outputs (Sym.CTS ,TagS) as FE.CTS .
To show that the simulated outputs are indistinguishable from the real outputs, consider
an intermediate simulator FE.Sim′ which is the same to FE.Sim, except that it uses the real
Sym ciphertexts in the ciphertext queries. Observe that the secret-key of Sym is not exposed
in FE.Sim′ or FE.Sim, the output distributions of FE.Sim′ and FE.Sim are indistinguishable
following the security of Sym.
Next, assume there is a distinguisher D for the outputs of the real FE scheme and
FE.Sim′, we build an attacker A for the PCPRF F. A samples a secret key for Sym, sends a
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constrained circuit query, obtains the real CK if it is the real distribution, or the simulated
CKS if it is the simulated distribution; then creates symmetric-key ciphertexts, sends as
the input queries to the PCPRF. It obtains the real outputs if it is the real case, or the
simulated outputs if it is the simulated case. A treats the outputs as tags. A forwards the
ciphertexts, tags and FSK to D. D’s success probability transfers to the one for A.
Remark 3.19. For functionalities with τ -bit outputs (represented by circuits C(m, i) =
Ci(m), i ∈ [τ ]), let the functional decryption key be CK[Sym.SK, C](Sym.CT, i). The
resulting ciphertext is composed of Sym.CT and {Tagi = F.Eval(F.MSK, (Sym.CT, i))}i∈[τ ],
with length |Sym.CT(m)|+ τλ.
Chapter 4
Lattices Background
An n-dimensional lattice Λ is a discrete additive subgroup of Rn. Given n linearly inde-
pendent basis vectors B = {b1, ...,bn ∈ Rn}, the lattice generated by B is
Λ(B) = Λ(b1, ...,bn) =
{
n∑
i=1
xi · bi, xi ∈ Z
}
.
Let B˜ denote the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B.
4.1 Gaussian on lattices
For any σ > 0 define the Gaussian function on Rn centered at c with parameter σ:
∀x ∈ Rn, ρσ,c(x) = e−pi‖x−c‖2/σ2
The subscripts σ and c are taken to be 1 and 0 (respectively) when omitted.
For any c ∈ Rn, real σ > 0, and n-dimensional lattice Λ, define the discrete Gaussian
distribution over Λ as:
∀x ∈ Λ, DΛ,σ,c(x) = ρσ,c(x)
ρσ,c(Λ)
Lemma 4.1 (Noise smudging [48]). Let y, σ ∈ R+. The statistical distance between the
distributions DZ,σ and DZ,σ+y is at most y/σ.
We recall the definition of smoothing parameter and some useful facts.
Definition 4.2 (Smoothing parameter [83]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and positive
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real  > 0, the smoothing parameter η(Λ) is the smallest real σ > 0 such that ρ1/σ(Λ
∗ \
{0}) ≤ .
Lemma 4.3 (Smoothing parameter bound from [58]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ(B)
and for any ω(
√
log n) function, there is a negligible (n) for which
η(Λ) ≤ ‖B˜‖ · ω(
√
log n)
Lemma 4.4 (Smooth over the cosets [58]). Let Λ, Λ′ be n-dimensional lattices s.t. Λ′ ⊆ Λ.
Then for any  > 0, σ > η(Λ
′), and c ∈ Rn, we have
∆(DΛ,σ,c mod Λ
′, U(Λ mod Λ′)) < 2
Lemma 4.5 ([89, 83]). Let B be a basis of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, and let σ ≥
‖B˜‖ · ω(log n), then Prx←DΛ,σ [‖x‖ ≥ σ ·
√
n ∨ x = 0] ≤ negl(n).
Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [58] show how to sample statistically close to
discrete Gaussian distribution in polynomial time for sufficiently large σ (the algorithm
is first proposed by Klein [78]). The sampler is upgraded in [29] so that the output is
distributed exactly as a discrete Gaussian.
Lemma 4.6 ([58, 29]). There is a p.p.t. algorithm that, given a basis B of an n-dimensional
lattice Λ(B), c ∈ Rn, σ ≥ ‖B˜‖ ·√ln(2n+ 4)/pi, outputs a sample from DΛ,σ,c.
4.2 Learning with errors
We recall the learning with errors problem.
Definition 4.7 (Decisional learning with errors (LWE) [91]). For n,m ∈ N and modulus
q ≥ 2, distributions for secret vectors, public matrices, and error vectors θ, pi, χ ⊆ Zq. An
LWE sample is obtained from sampling s ← θn, A ← pin×m, e ← χm, and outputting
(A, sTA + eT mod q).
30
We say that an algorithm solves LWEn,m,q,θ,pi,χ if it distinguishes the LWE sample from
a random sample distributed as pin×m × U(Z1×mq ) with probability bigger than 1/2 plus
non-negligible.
Lemma 4.8 (Regularity of Ajtai function [91]). Fix a constant c > 1, let m ≥ cn log q.
Then for all but q
−(c−1)n
4 fraction of A ∈ Zn×mq , the statistical distance between a random
subset-sum of the columns of A and uniform over Znq is less than q
−(c−1)n
4 .
Lemma 4.9 (Standard form [91, 87, 29, 88]). Given n ∈ N, for any m = poly(n), q ≤
2poly(n). Let θ = pi = U(Zq), χ = DZ,σ where σ ≥ 2
√
n. If there exists an efficient (possibly
quantum) algorithm that breaks LWEn,m,q,θ,pi,χ, then there exists an efficient (possibly
quantum) algorithm for approximating SIVP and GapSVP in the `2 norm, in the worst
case, to within O˜(nq/σ) factors.
We drop the subscripts of LWE when referring to standard form of LWE with the
parameters specified in Lemma 4.9. In this article we frequently use the following variant
of LWE that is implied by the standard form.
Lemma 4.10 (LWE with small secrets [6, 29]). For n,m, q, σ chosen as was in Lemma 4.9,
LWEn,m′,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ is as hard as LWEn,m,q,U(Zq),U(Zq),DZ,σ form
′ ≤ m−(16n+4 log log q).
Lemma 4.11 (LWE with small public matrices [22]). For n,m, q, σ chosen as was in
Lemma 4.9, LWEn′,m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ is as hard as LWEn,m,q,U(Zq),U(Zq),DZ,σ for n
′ ≥ 2·n log q.
4.3 Lattice trapdoor and preimage sampling
Given A ∈ Zn×mq , denote the kernel lattice of A as
Λ⊥(A) := {c ∈ Zm : A · c = 0n (mod q)} .
Given any y ∈ Znq , σ > 0, we use A−1(y, σ) to denote the distribution of a vector d sampled
from DZm,σ conditioned on Ad = y (mod q). We sometimes suppress σ when the context
is clear.
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Lemma 4.12 ([3, 5, 82]). There is a p.p.t. algorithm TrapSam(1n, 1m, q) that, given the
modulus q ≥ 2, dimensions n, m such that m ≥ 2n log q, outputs A ≈s U(Zn×mq ) with a
trapdoor τ .
Following Lemmas 4.6 and 4.12,
Lemma 4.13. There is a p.p.t. algorithm that for σ ≥ 2√n log q, given (A, τ) ←
TrapSam(1n, 1m, q), y ∈ Znq , outputs a sample from A−1(y, σ).
Lemma 4.14 ([58]). For all but negligible probability over (A, τ) ← TrapSam(1n, 1m, q),
for sufficiently large σ ≥ 2√n log q, the following distributions are efficiently samplable and
statistically close:
{
A,x,y : y← U(Znq ),x← A−1(y, σ)
} ≈s {A,x,y : x← DZm,σ,y = Ax} .
Chapter 5
Two or Three Things I Know about
Pseudorandom Functions
Before constructing private constrained PRFs from lattices, I would like to take a stroll
through the existing pseudorandom functions as a prelude. The purpose is not to enu-
merate everything we know about pseudorandom functions, but to extract the conceptual
connections that are essential to the birth of new constructions.
5.1 PRFs before the lattice era
In the same paper where Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali define a pseudorandom function
[60], they also provide an elegant construction of PRF from any pseudorandom generator,
which is later proved to exist as long as one-way functions exist [73]. We refer to the
construction as the GGM construction.
Construction 5.1 ([60]). Let G : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}2m be a length doubling PRG. Let the
first and last m output bits of G be G0 and G1. Construct a function family F consisting
of functions F : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}m as follows. The key generation algorithm samples a
random string s← U({0, 1}m) as the secret key. The evaluation algorithm takes an input
x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
Fs(x) = G
x`(Gx`−1(...Gx2(Gx1(s))...)).
The GGM construction serves as the source of inspiration for countless cryptographic
constructions. One of the descendants is the subset-product-based PRF from [86].
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Construction 5.2 ([86]). Let G be a cyclic group with a generator g. Construct a function
family F consisting of functions F : {0, 1}` → G as follows. The key generation algorithm
samples ` + 1 random strings s, a1, a2, ..., a` ← U(|G|) as the secret key. The evaluation
algorithm takes an input x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
Fs,a1,a2,...,a`(x) = g
s·∏`i=1 axii .
The construction can be thought as being derived from GGM in two steps. In the first
step, consider the (family of) PRGs Ga as
Ga : |G| → G×G, s 7→ ga, gas,
then under decisional DDH assumption Gga is a PRG.
A step further, consider the family G′a as a twist of Ga
G′a : G→ G×G, gs 7→ ga, gas.
Such a mapping is typically not efficiently computable unless the underlying group admits
a pairing operation. However when using the resulting function F as a PRF, the exponents
can be written directly in the secret key.
5.2 PRFs based on lattice assumptions
Banerjee, Peikert, and Rosen propose the first construction of PRF from lattices [11].
The construction takes the subset-product structure from [86], and smartly uses rounding
instead of adding noises (which will otherwise make the construction non-deterministic).
Construction 5.3 ([11]). Let `, n, p, q, B ∈ N, σ,∈ R s.t. n = λ, σ = Ω(√λ · log q),
χ = DZ,σ. B ≥ ` · (
√
nσ)
`
, q = p ·B · ω(poly(λ)).
Define a function family F consisting of functions F : {0, 1}` → Znp , for which the key
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generation algorithm samples a← U(Znq ) as the public parameter,
{
Si,b ← Dn×nZ,σ
}
b∈{0,1},i∈[`]
as the private-key.
The evaluation algorithm takes an input x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
F{Si,b}b∈{0,1},i∈[`](x) =
⌊(∏`
i=1
Si,xi
)
· a
⌉
p
.
Lemma 5.4 ([11]). Construction 5.3 is a PRF assuming LWEn,poly,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ is hard.
Boneh, Lewi, Montgomery, and Raghunathan [22] came with a motivation of achieving
key-homomorphism. They flip the roles of matrices with big norms and ones with small
norms.
Construction 5.5 ([22]). Let `,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ,∈ R s.t. m = Ω(λ · log q), σ =
Ω(
√
λ · log q), χ = DZ,σ. B ≥ ` · (
√
mσ)
`
, q = p ·B · ω(poly(λ)).
Define a function family F consisting of functions F : {0, 1}` → Zmp , for which the key
generation algorithm samples a ← U(Zmq ) as the private key,
{
Si,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
b∈{0,1},i∈[`]
as the public parameters.
The evaluation algorithm takes an input x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
Fa(x) =
⌊(∏`
i=1
Si,xi
)
· a
⌉
p
.
Lemma 5.6 ([22]). Construction 5.5 is a PRF assuming LWEm,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ is hard.
We refer to Constructions 5.3 and 5.5 as BPR and BLMR PRFs.
Alternatives of the BPR and BLMR constructions. For both the BPR and the
BLMR construction, I would like to discuss more about their unrounded variants. If we
add fresh noise (with a moderately big magnitude) on each of the input query, instead of
rounding the result of subset product. Such constructions are still “randomized PRFs”
(they are not real PRFs since they are not deterministic).
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We state the following lemma for the unrounded version of BLMR which is implicit
from the proof of [11, Theorem 5.2].
Lemma 5.7 (Implicit from [11, 22]). Let `,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ, σ∗ ∈ R s.t. m = Ω(λ · log q),
σ = Ω(
√
λ · log q), χ = DZ,σ. B ≥ ` · (
√
mσ)
`
, σ∗ > ω(poly(λ)) ·B, q ≥ σ∗ · ω(poly(λ)).
Define a function family F consisting of functions F : {0, 1}` → Zmq , for which the key
generation algorithm samples a ← U(Zmq ) as the private key,
{
Si,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
b∈{0,1},i∈[`]
as the public parameters.
The evaluation algorithm takes input x ∈ {0, 1}`, computes
fa(x) =
(∏`
i=1
Si,xi
)
· a + Ex = Sx · a + Ex (mod q),
where Ex ← DmZ,σ∗ is sampled freshly for every x.
Then assuming the hardness of LWEm,poly,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ . For d = poly(λ) different
input queries x[1], ..., x[d], the outputs fa(x
[1]), ..., fa(x
[d]) are computationally indistin-
guishable from d independent uniformly random vectors from Zmq .
Proof sketch. We first consider an expression analogous to the one in the proof of [11,
Lemma 5.5]
f˜a(x) :=
(
S1,x1 · . . .
(
S`−1,x`−1 · (S`,x` · a + E`,x`) + E`−1,x`−1
)
. . .+ E1,x1
)
+ Ex
= fa(x) +
∑`
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
Sj,xj
 ·Ei,xi

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:E∗x
(mod q). (5.1)
where E1,x1 , ...,E`,x` are sampled independently from χ
m. Therefore we have ‖E∗x‖∞ ≤ B,
hence f˜a(x) ≈s fa(x) due to Lemma 4.1 and the setting of parameters σ∗ > ω(poly(λ)) ·B,
Ex ← DmZ,σ∗ (in the proof of [11, Theorem 5.2] the additional terms are added due to
rounding.)
Once we have Eqn. (5.1) the rest of the proof follows the proof of [11, Theorem 5.2],
except that we use LWEm,poly,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ instead of LWEm,poly,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ .
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Note that Constructions 5.3 and 5.5 without rounding or without adding fresh noise do
not give pseudorandom functions. This holds in general for constructions that are purely
based on subset products of random matrices.
Claim 5.8. Constructions 5.3 and 5.5 are not PRFs without rounding.
Proof. The main idea of the attack is to form a matrix from the evaluations on different
inputs. For a real function we argue that the rank of such a matrix is bounded. For a truly
random function the matrix is full-rank whp.
We prove for Construction 5.3 (for Construction 5.5 the proof is the same).
Algorithm 5.9 (rank attack). The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Let ρ > n. Divide the ` input bits into 2 intervals [`] = X | Y such that |X |, |Y| ≥
dlog ρe.
2. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ρ, evaluate the function F : {0, 1}` → Znq on ρ2 different inputs of the
form u(i,j) = x(i) | y(j) ∈ {0, 1}`. Let v(i,j) ∈ Zq be the first entry of the evaluation
result on u(i,j):
v(i,j) := e1 · F (u(i,j)) (mod q),
where e1 = (1 | 0 | ... | 0) ∈ {0, 1}1×n.
3. Output the rank of matrix V = (v(i,j)) ∈ Zρ×ρq .
For a truly random function, for sufficiently large q, the rank of V is ρ whp.
However, for the function in Construction 5.3 without rounding, which gives v(i,j) =
e1 · Su(i,j) · a (mod q). The rank of V is bounded by n, since
V =

v(1,1) ... v(1,ρ)
... ... ...
v(ρ,1) ... v(ρ,ρ)
 =

e1 · Sx(1)
...
e1 · Sx(ρ)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=X∈Zρ×nq
·
(
Sy(1) · a ... Sy(ρ) · a
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Y∈Zn×ρq
(mod q), (5.2)
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where we abuse the subset product notation at Sy(j) so that the index starts at |X |+ 1.
5.3 Existing Constrained PRFs
The tree structure of the GGM construction readily gives a way of deriving a partial key
that preserves the evaluation results on some input but not the others. Officially, it was
observed in [26, 76, 28] with different motivations that the GGM construction is punc-
turable. However, the notion of a puncturable PRF is arguably popularized by the work
of Sahai and Waters [93], where it is used together with indistinguishability obfuscation to
launch the age of discovery of Cryptoland.
An immediate observation from the iO of puncturable PRF construction is that it
already gives a constrained PRF for all circuits [27]. In fact the construction hides the
constraint, as was formalized in [23].
Here is an important lemma about indistinguishability obfuscation of puncturable PRF
that one should keep in mind even without a concrete application. For arbitrary punc-
turable PRF families F1,F2 : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ) that are 2−`(λ) · negl(λ)-secure, the
pseudorandom functions sampled independently from these families are indistinguishable
after being obfuscated by 2−`(λ)·negl(λ)-secure indistinguishability obfuscation. The follow-
ing lemma is derived from the “piO” proof methodology developed in the work of Canetti
et al. [39].
Lemma 5.10 ([39, 36]). Let F1,F2 : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ) be 2−`(λ) ·negl(λ)-secure punc-
turable PRF families, iO be iO = 2
−`(λ) · negl(λ)-secure indistinguishability obfuscation.
Let FK1
$← F1, FK2 $← F2, then iO(FK1) and iO(FK2) are indistinguishable.
Proof. We prove the indistinguishability via 2`(λ) + 1 intermediate hybrids, one for each
38
input. More precisely, for z∗ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2`(λ) − 1, 2`(λ)}, we construct fz∗ as
fz∗(x) = iO

if x = z∗, return FK1(x)
else, return
 if x > z∗, return FK1(x)
else, return FK2(x)


Note that f0 is functionally equivalent to FK1 , therefore, they are 2
−`(λ) · negl(λ) indistin-
guishable after being obfuscated by iO. Likewise, f2`(λ) is functionally equivalent to FK2 ,
hence being 2−`(λ) · negl(λ)-indistinguishable following iO.
Next we show that each intermediate pairs fz∗ and fz∗+1, z
∗ ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2`(λ) − 1}, are
2−`(λ) · negl(λ)-indistinguishable. We introduce 3 more sub-hybrids:
fz∗,y∗(x) = iO

if x = z∗, return y∗
else, return
 if x > z∗, return FK1{z∗}(x)
else, return FK2{z∗}(x)


where y∗ equals to FK1(z∗), U
$← {0, 1}m(λ), and FK2(z∗) respectively.
Note that fz∗,FK1 (z∗) is functionally equivalent to fz
∗ ; fz∗,FK2 (z∗) is functionally equiva-
lent to fz∗+1. They are 2
−`(λ)·negl(λ)-indistinguishable following iO. In between, fz∗,FK1 (z∗)
is indistinguishable from fz∗,U and fz∗,U is indistinguishable from fz∗,FK2 (z∗), following the
2−`(λ) · negl(λ)-puncturability of K1 and K2.
To conclude, fz∗ and fz∗+1 are 4 · 2−`(λ) · negl(λ)-indistinguishable following the 2−`(λ) ·
negl(λ) security of F1, F2, and iO. Summing up all the 2`(λ) + 1 intermediate hybrids, the
total advantage of distinguishing iO(FK1) and iO(FK2) is negligible.
Lemma 5.10 immediately implies that iO of a puncturable PRF satisfies single-key
constraint-hiding without evaluation queries.
Before 2017, without using iO or multilinear maps, the work of Brakerski and Vaikun-
tanathan [32] was the only one that constructs constrained PRFs for all circuits from LWE
assumption, even in the setting of one-key security, without constraint-hiding.
Chapter 6
Matrix Branching Programs
Before describing the constructions of private constrained PRFs, we introduce some termi-
nologies for matrix branching programs. A matrix branching program consists of a sequence
of steps, where each step is associated with two matrices and an index of some input bit.
To evaluate such a branching program over some input string, we choose one of the two ma-
trices from each step, depending on the value of the corresponding input bit, then multiply
all these matrices in order, and compare the result to the target matrices.
Definition 6.1 (Matrix branching program). Let `, h ∈ N be the bit-length of the input
and the index of a branching program. An index-to-input map ι : [h]→ [`] and an input-
to-index map $ : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}h come in pairs, i.e. $(x)i = xι(i), ∀i ∈ [h], x ∈ {0, 1}`.
A dimension-w, length-h matrix branching program over `-bit inputs consists of a pair
of maps ($, ι), a sequence of pairs of 0-1 matrices, and two disjoint sets of target matrices
Γ =
{
$, ι,
{
Mi,b ∈ {0, 1}w×w
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,P0,P1 ⊂ {0, 1}w×w
}
.
This branching program is computing the function fΓ : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}, defined as
fΓ(x) =

0 if M$(x) =
∏
i∈[h] Mi,xι(i) ∈ P0
1 if M$(x) =
∏
i∈[h] Mi,xι(i) ∈ P1
Remark 6.2. Since one of ι, $ uniquely defines the other, in the branching programs used
in this paper we typically specify only one of them.
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In concrete applications, additional features on the target sets P0,P1 are required to
perform the correct functionality. Here are two specific types of target sets that are used in
this thesis (note that the functionalities covered by the 2 types are not mutually exclusive.)
Definition 6.3 (Type I branching programs). Given an input-to-index map $, an integer
w ≥ 2. The set of Type I matrix branching programs G$,w satisfies
1. All Γ ∈ G$,w are associated with the same input-to-index map $; all the matrices in
Γ have the same dimension w.
2. For all Γ ∈ G$,w, the target sets P0, P1 satisfies e1 · P1 = {e1}, e2 · P0 = {e1}, and
there exists j ∈ {2, ..., w} s.t. e1 · P0 = {ej}.
The branching programs obtained by Barrington’s theorem directly satisfy Defini-
tion 6.3. They enjoy an additional feature that all the matrices are permutations.
Theorem 6.4 (Barrington’s theorem [15]). For d,w ∈ N, w ≥ 5, and for any set of depth-d
fan-in-2 Boolean circuits, there is a set of width-w length-4d Type I branching programs,
where in addition, all the matrices {Mi,b ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[4d],b∈{0,1} are permutation matri-
ces.
Definition 6.5 (Type II branching programs). For a vector v ∈ {0, 1}1×w, an input-to-
index map $, an integer w. The set of Type II branching programs Gv,$,w satisfies
1. All Γ ∈ Gv,$,w are associated with the same input-to-index map $; all the matrices
in Γ have the same dimension w.
2. For all Γ ∈ Gv,$,w, the target sets P0, P1 satisfies v · P1 =
{
01×w
}
; v · P0 ⊆
{0, 1}1×w \ {01×w}.
We describe a specific branching program representations of CNFs from [57]. The
resulting branching program representation is of Type II, read-once, and the matrices are
diagonal.
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Construction 6.6 (Type II BP representation of CNF). Given a conjunction normal form
(CNF) formula Ψ with ` variables and w clauses, namely Ψ = ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψw, where each
clause ψi is a disjunction of the literals x1, ..., x` and their negations x¯1, ..., x¯`.
Construct ΓΨ =
{
ι, {Mi,b ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[`],b∈{0,1} ,P0,P1
}
such that ι(v) = v, v ∈ [`];
P1 = {0w×w}, P0 is the set of w-dimensional 0-1 diagonal matrices excluding 0w×w. In
other words, 
Mx = 0 if Ψ(x) = 1
Mx 6= 0 if Ψ(x) = 0
.
The matrices in ΓΨ are constructed as follows.
1. Initialization: for all i ∈ [`], b ∈ {0, 1}, Let Mi,b := Iw×w.
2. If xi appears in ψj : set the j
th entry on the diagonal of Mi,1 to be 0.
3. If x¯i appears in ψj : set the j
th entry on the diagonal of Mi,0 to be 0.
This branching program has length ` and width w.
Chapter 7
Overview of the Constructions of Private
Constrained PRFs
Our main constructions of private constrained PRFs start from the basic lattice-based
PRF of [11], then embed the constraint represented by matrix branching programs, finally
apply the GGH15 graded encoding scheme [56] on top of them. This chapter serves as an
overview of the constructions. During the course I hope to explain why the GGH15 graded
encoding scheme comes into the picture.
7.1 Why GGH15?
The graph-induced multilinear maps were proposed by Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi [56]
(henceforth GGH15) as a candidate instantiation of cryptographic multilinear maps [25].
We will not go through the glorious history of multilinear maps here. Instead I would like
to introduce GGH15 via its striking similarity to the lattice-based PRFs.
A GGH15 encoding of a low-norm square matrix S w.r.t. two matrices A0 and A1 is
defined to be along the edge A0 7→ A1 and is computed as (using A0 and its trapdoor)
D← A−10 (SA1 + E) (7.1)
which means that D is a low-norm matrix such that A0D = SA1 + E mod q.
For 2` matrices {Si,b}i∈[`],b∈{0,1} assigned over a chain of length `, where each Si,b is
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assigned on an edge Ai−1 7→ Ai. The encodings are generated as
Di,b ← A−1i−1(Si,bAi + Ei,b). (7.2)
Evaluating the encodings on any input x ∈ {0, 1}` gives
A0 ·Dx = Sx ·A` +
∑`
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
Sj,xj ·Ei,xi ·
∏`
k=i+1
Dk,xk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
E′x
(mod q). (7.3)
where E′x is a summation of matrices of small norms. Under proper settings of parameters,
the E′x term will disappear after rounding.
We can interpret GGH15 as taking input the secret keys of the BPR PRF (cf. Con-
struction 5.3). The encodings then become the keys of BLMR PRF (cf. Construction 5.5),
illustrated as follows:
S1,0
S1,1
,
S2,0
S2,1
, ...,
S`,0
S`,1
,A`
GGH15
⇁ A0,
D1,0
D1,1
,
D2,0
D2,1
, ...,
D`,0
D`,1
. (7.4)
7.2 Why Generalized GGH15?
To turn the striking similarity of GGH15 and lattice-based PRFs into a private constrained
PRF, one has to first figure out the constraining functionality. We choose to represent the
constraints as matrix branching programs Γ =
{
$, {Mi,b ∈ Zw×w}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,P1,P0
}
,
then embed the matrices into the secret keys {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}. Finally, the generalized
GGH15 will take care of the embedded secret keys and produce the constrained keys.
Formally, let γ denote an embedding
γ : Zw×w × Zn×n → Zt×t, Mi,b,Si,b 7→ Sˆi,b.
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For concreteness, the readers can keep in mind the following two embeddings
γ⊗(M,S) := M⊗ S, γ⊗diag(M,S) :=
M⊗ S
S
 . (7.5)
These two maps are multiplicatively homomorphic, i.e.
γ(M,S) · γ(M′,S′) = γ(M ·M′,S · S′).
Therefore we can think of
(
h∏
i=1
Sˆi,xι(i)
)
·Ah =
(
h∏
i=1
γ(Mi,xι(i) ,Si,xι(i))
)
·Ah = γ(M$(x),S$(x)) ·Ah
as the evaluation result on input x (before rounding and possibly some truncations). Now
the functionality of constraining has almost been established, except for the details in
the representing of the “original” and “constrained” outputs, which are related to the
assignment of the target sets P1, P0 in the branching program.
Before fixing all the details in the functionality, let us understand how far are we away
from achieving constraint-hiding. Suppose we simply output the keys
{
Sˆi,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
and
Ah, then at least for the two γ functions in Eqn. (7.5), the matrices Sˆi,b = γ(Mi,b,Si,b)
directly reveal Mi,b. We choose to encode the entire Sˆ matrix using a generalization of
GGH15 (cf. Eqn. (7.2)), with the hope that the encodings smooth out the structures in
the Sˆ matrices:
Di,b ← A−1i−1(Sˆi,bAi + Ei,b). (7.6)
The functionality of the generalized encodings is similar to that shown in Eqn. (7.3).
Namely for all x ∈ {0, 1}`,
A0 ·D$(x) ≈ γ(M$(x),S$(x)) ·Ah (mod q),
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where ≈ absorbs the additive error terms that depend on ‖Di,b‖, ‖Ei,b‖, ‖γ(Mi,b,Si,b)‖,
which are required to be small.
We call the generalized encoding a´ la Eqn. (7.6) generalized GGH15, or γ-GGH15. The
analogy of (7.4) is
γ(M1,0,S1,0)
γ(M1,1,S1,1)
,
γ(M2,0,S2,0)
γ(M2,1,S2,1)
, ...,
γ(Mh,0,Sh,0)
γ(Mh,1,Sh,1)
,Ah
γ-GGH15
⇁ A0,
D1,0
D1,1
,
D2,0
D2,1
, ...,
Dh,0
Dh,1
. (7.7)
So far we have described the functionality of γ-GGH15. Still, it is not clear whether the
matrices Mi,b are hidden under the encodings A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}. Consider an extreme
example where for certain i ∈ [h], Ai and its trapdoor τi are used to sample preimages of
small error terms. Then the preimages (say Di+1,b) might reveal a “weak trapdoor” of Ai,
hence threatening the LWE samples that uses Ai as the LWE public matrix (even if Ai is
not public).
To formally analyze the security property, we define semantic security for generalized
GGH15, which requires that given the embedding γ, the plaintext matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1},
the encodings A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are indistinguishable from random.
In the next two sections we will illustrate two specific types of γ and M matrices that
express useful constraining functionality, and satisfy semantic security (which means the
encoding hides the underlying M matrices).
7.3 Embedding permutation matrix branching programs
Our first choice is to set Sˆ as the tensor product of a permutation matrix M ∈ {0, 1}w×w
and a random low-norm matrix S ∈ Zn×n. Namely we use the γ⊗ from Eqn. (7.5). Given
as input a permutation branching program Γ =
{
$, {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
}
, we compute
Di,b := A
−1
i−1((Mi,b ⊗ Si,b)Ai + Ei,b).
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As an example of γ⊗, consider
M =

0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

which is a permutation matrix corresponding to the cyclic shift pi that sends 1 7→ 2 7→ 3 7→
1. Then, for any S ∈ Zn×n and any A(1),A(2),A(3) ∈ Zn×mq , we have:
(M⊗ S)

A(1)
A(2)
A(3)
 =

0 S 0
0 0 S
S 0 0


A(1)
A(2)
A(3)
 =

SA(2)
SA(3)
SA(1)

In general, let pi : [w] → [w] denote a permutation on [w], and let M ∈ {0, 1}w×w denote
the standard representation of pi as a matrix. Then, for any S ∈ Zn×n and any A ∈ Znw×mq ,
we have
(M⊗ S)A =

SA(pi(1))
...
SA(pi(w))
 , where A =

A(1)
...
A(w)
 ,A(1), . . . ,A(w) ∈ Zn×mq (7.8)
The reason to consider a permutation matrix M ∈ {0, 1}w×w at the first place is that
Sˆ = M⊗ S automatically gives an “LWE-friendly” secret distribution, namely
((M⊗ S)A + E),A ≈c U(Zwn×mq × Zwn×mq )
Then we claim that the permutation matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are hidden under the
encodings. More concretely, we will show that, for i = h, h− 1, ..., 1,
(Ai−1,A−1i−1((Mi,b ⊗ Si,b)Ai + Ei,b)) ≈c (Ai−1,Vi,b) (7.9)
where A0, ...,Ah are uniformly random over Zwn×mq , and the S,V,E matrices are inde-
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pendently random from Gaussian with the corresponding dimensions.
In the analysis, we assume all the A matrices are public (although they do not have
to be). From i = h down to 1. In Step i, we first trigger LWE by using Ai as the public
matrix, and (Mi,b ⊗ Si,b) as the LWE-friendly secret distribution; then apply the GPV
preimage sampling lemma (cf. Lemma 4.14) to “close the trapdoor” of Ai−1, so that we
can use Ai−1 as the LWE public matrix in Step i − 1. This concludes the proof idea for
semantic security.
We wrap up this section by stating the constraining functionality provided by γ⊗-
GGH15 used together with permutation matrices. Following Barrington’s theorem (cf.
Theorem 6.4), we get a private constrained PRF for all NC1 circuit constraints. More
concretely, let
⌊
S$(x)A
(1)
⌉ ∈ Zn×m be the output of the original PRF (i.e. C(x) = 1). The
constrained key evaluation is defined as
FCK(x) :=
⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
,
where J := In×n | 0n×(w−1)n. So when M$(x) = I, the first n rows of S$(x)A will be
selected; when M$(x) 6= I, then n other rows will be selected.
7.4 Embedding general (possibly low-rank) matrix branching programs
The motivation of going beyond permutation matrix branching programs is twofold. First
and foremost, we simply want to explore more options. Secondly, representing some simple
functionalities using permutation matrices could be awkwardly complicated. As an example
for the second concern, the simplest way I know of getting a private puncturable PRF from
the permutation-based construction is to apply Barrington’s Theorem, which leads to a
O(`2) step branching program for an `-bit function.
Example 7.1. Here is the embedded secret key (i.e. those underneath the GGH15 en-
coding) of a 2-bit puncturable PRF punctured on x∗ = 11 obtained from Barrington’s
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Theorem, where P = (12345),Q = (13542), $(x1 | x2) = x1 | x2 | x1 | x2.
I⊗ S1,0
P⊗ S1,1
,
I⊗ S2,0
Q⊗ S2,1
,
I⊗ S3,0
P−1 ⊗ S3,1
,
I⊗ S4,0
Q−1 ⊗ S4,1
, A4. (7.10)
Since (12345)(13542)(54321)(24531) = (13254) [15, Page 153], on input x = x∗ = 11, the
constrained evaluation outputs
⌊
S$(11)A
(3)
4
⌉
. When x 6= x∗, the constrained evaluation
outputs
⌊
S$(x)A
(1)
4
⌉
, preserving the functionality.
If the restriction of using permutation matrices Mi,b can be removed, we can easily
achieve puncturing functionality using read-once branching programs (i.e. h = `). Here is
a natural idea: let the punctured key at x∗ be
Sˆi,x∗i =
Si,x∗i
Si,x∗i
 , Sˆi,1−x∗i =
0
Si,1−x∗
 , for i ∈ [`];
then apply GGH15 encoding on the Sˆ matrices to obtain A0, {Di,b}i∈[`],b∈{0,1}. For all
Ai ∈ Z2n×mq , i ∈ [0, `], denote the top and bottom half of Ai as
Ai
Ai
. Define the normal
PRF evaluation as
x 7→ bSxA`ep .
In the punctured key, we publish A0 + A0 instead of A0. Then the evaluation gives
⌊
(A0 + A0)Dx
⌉
=

bSxA`e if x 6= x∗⌊
SxA` + SxA`
⌉
if x = x∗
Example 7.2. To achieve a 2-bit puncturable PRF punctured on x∗ = 11 using low-rank
matrix branching programs, the embedded secret key (underneath the GGH15 encoding)
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is composed of  0
S1,0

S1,1
S1,1
 ,
 0
S2,0

S2,1
S2,1
 , A2. (7.11)
More generally, assuming the branching program Γ is of Type II (cf. Def 6.5), we define
γ⊗diag that embed an arbitrary matrix M in Sˆ as
γ⊗diag : M,S 7→
M⊗ S
S
 .
Let A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} be the result of γ⊗diag-GGH15 encoding. For all Ai ∈ Z
(w+1)n×m
q ,
i ∈ [0, h], denote the n rows in the bottom as Ai and the rest wn rows as Ai. Let the PRF
evaluation be
x 7→ ⌊S$(x)Ah⌉p .
In the constrained key, we publish J ·A0 instead of A0, where J = [v | 1] ⊗ I. Then the
constrained evaluation on x outputs
⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
=

⌊
S$(x)Ah
⌉
if C(x) = 1⌊
S$(x)A
(∗)
h + S$(x)Ah
⌉
if C(x) = 0
where A
(∗)
h denotes at least 1 block (of n rows) from Ah. This completes the description
of the functionality.
To argue the semantic security of γ⊗diag requires the following analogue of Expres-
sion (7.9): for arbitrary M ∈ {0, 1}w×w,
JAi−1,A−1i−1
Mi,b ⊗ Si,b
Si,b
Ai + Ei,b
 ≈c (JAi−1,V) (7.12)
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where J is any matrix of the form [? | I]; Ai−1,Ai,S,V,E are distributed as in (7.9).
To prove the statement in (7.12) requires quite a dramatic twist in the proof strategy.
Using the Sˆ = γ⊗diag(M,S) and A matrices as the secret and public matrices of LWE does
not work anymore, since decisional LWE is simply false when M is a low-rank matrix.
Instead we will treat the S matrices as the public matrices known to the distinguisher.
In particular, we start with taking the bottom part of Ai as the LWE secret, in conjunction
with the public S in the bottom-right diagonal; then use an extension of the GPV trapdoor
sampling lemma to produce an “oblique” (while indistinguishable) preimage sample using
only the top part of Ai−1; finally argue that the “oblique” sample is indistinguishable from
random Gaussian using the top part of A0 as the LWE secret. Walking through these steps
requires new techniques in analyzing the lattice preimage sampling algorithms. They will
be detailed separately in Chapter 10.
7.5 References and implications
We provide a preview of the next few chapters and their references.
• Chapter 8 describes the generalized GGH15 framework. It is mainly based on [42].
• Chapters 9 and 11 provide the PCPRFs for permutation branching programs and
general branching program. Each of them starts from a proof of semantic security
of the generalized GGH15 encoding, then presents the PCPRF construction whose
constraint-hiding property follows closely from the semantic security just proved.
Between them, Chapter 10 provides the new techniques on analyzing lattice trapdoor
sampling that are needed in Chapter 11.
• In Chapter 12 we show a generic transformation from rerandomizable private punc-
turable PRFs to private programmable PRFs. The transformation is folklore and we
give a formal analysis.
We wrap up this chapter by summarizing the connection of our constructions with the
related works on GGH15, private constrained PRFs, and beyond.
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Related work on GGH15. The structural ingredients of the GGH15 encodings was
also discovered from the view-point of “cascaded cancellations” in [79] and “telescoping
products” in [4], both with the motivation of showing counterexamples for circular security.
In [56], the potential security notion is not explicitly defined. So our γ-GGH15 framework
extends GGH15 in both generalizing the construction and contributing security notions.
The different types of γ function can also find themselves under implicit forms in
the related works. Roughly speaking, the following types of γ functions are used in the
literature:
• γ× : {0, 1}w×w ×R→ Rw×w,M, s 7→M× s, where R is a commutative ring.
γ× was used in [56], [33].
• γ⊗ : {0, 1}w×w × Zn×n → Z(wn)×(wn), M,S 7→M⊗ S.
γ⊗ with permutation matrices M was studied in [35, 69, 68, 96].
• γdiag : Zw×w × Zn×n → Z(w+n)×(w+n), M,S 7→
M
S
.
• γ⊗diag : {0, 1}w×w × Zn×n → Z(wn+n)×(wn+n), M,S 7→
M⊗ S
S
.
γdiag and γ⊗diag (with the diagonal randomness as their common feature) are im-
plicitly used in the obfuscation literature [53, 56], and is explicitly analyzed in [42].
Our analysis of γdiag and γ⊗diag (see Chapter 11) also yields constructions of lockable
obfuscation [68] (a.k.a. obfuscation “compute then compare” functionality [96]) for
general branching programs.
Related work on private constrained PRFs. Concurrent with [35], Boneh et al.
[20] and Brakerski et al. [30] construct private constrained PRFs for puncturing and for
poly-size circuit constraints based on LWE. Their methodology is to take duality views of
the components in the existing lattice-based FHE [31, 59], ABE [66, 19], and constrained
PRFs [10, 32, 9]. Such a methodology is originated from [67]. It is believed that there
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are some connections between the FHE+ABE/CPRF approach and the GGH15 approach.
Finding out such a connection seems to be an interesting open problem.
To achieve a private-detectable watermarking scheme following the construction in [23]
requires a private programmable PRF, which is not immediately implied by a private
puncturable PRF, but still follows a rerandomizable puncturing algorithm. The approach
is folklore, as mentioned in the work of Kim and Wu [77]. Instead, [77] introduces an
intermediate notion of translucent PRF, which is like a partial programmable PRF, and is
sufficient for watermarking.
Peikert and Shiehian [90] propose an direct construction of private programmable PRF,
different from the generic transformation mentioned in Chapter 12. An interesting proposal
from their paper is the abstraction of “shift-hiding shift function”, which shares a similar
point of view from what we mentioned in Section 3.4.
Boneh, Kim and Wu [21] investigate constrained PRFs for invertible functions, with
a motivation of achieving puncturable pseudorandom permutations. I would like to men-
tion that, even without concerning the ability of inverting, constructing a puncturable
pseudorandom permutation remains an open problem.
Chapter 8
Generalized GGH15 Encodings
We present the abstraction of generalized GGH15 encodings. The abstraction includes a
construction framework and definitions of security notions.
We think of the generalized or γ-GGH15 as encoding two collections of matrices, one
collection is arbitrary and the other one is random, and computing some function γ of a
subset product of these matrices. More concretely, the γ-GGH15 encoding takes as input
two collections of matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} , {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, an additional matrix A`.
The output is a collection of matrices A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
8.1 The construction framework
We begin with a description of the construction:
Construction 8.1 (γ-GGH15 Encodings). The randomized algorithm ggh.encode takes
the following inputs
• Parameters 1λ, h, n,m, q, t, w ∈ N, σ ∈ R∗ and the description of a distribution χ
over Z1.
• A function γ : Zw×w × Zn×n → Zt×t.
• Matrices
{
Mi,b ∈ Zw×wi,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
{
Si,b ∈ Zn×ni,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
.
• A matrix Ah ∈ Zt×mq .
It generates the output as follows
1In the rest of the presentation, these parameters are omitted in the input of ggh.encode.
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• Samples {Ai, τi ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q)}i∈{0,1,...,h−1}.
• Samples {Ei,b ← χt×m}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
• For i ∈ [h], b ∈ {0, 1}, let Sˆi,b := γ(Mi,b,Si,b), then samples
Di,b ← A−1i−1(Sˆi,b ·Ai + Ei,b, σ)
using τi−1.
• Outputs A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
We require γ to be multiplicatively homomorphic:
γ(M,S) · γ(M′,S′) = γ(M ·M′,S · S′)
Functionality. The next lemma captures the functionality provided by the construction,
namely that for all x ∈ {0, 1}h,
A0 ·Dx ≈ γ(Mx,Sx) ·Ah
Lemma 8.2 (Functionality of γ-GGH15 encodings). Suppose γ is multiplicatively ho-
momorphic. For all inputs to the Construction 8.1 s.t. σ > Ω(
√
t log q), m > Ω(t log q),
‖χ‖ ≤ σ; we have for all x ∈ {0, 1}h, with all but negligible probability over the randomness
in Construction 8.1,
‖A0 ·Dx − γ(Mx,Sx) ·Ah‖∞ ≤ h ·
(
mσ ·max
i,b
‖γ(Mi,b,Si,b)‖
)h
.
Proof. Recall Sˆi,b = γ(Mi,b,Si,b). It is straight-forward to prove by induction that for all
h′ = 0, 1, . . . , h:
A0 ·
h′∏
k=1
Dk,xk =
 h′∏
i=1
Sˆi,xi
Ah′ + h′∑
j=1
(j−1∏
i=1
Sˆi,xi
)
·Ej,xj ·
h∏
k=j+1
Dk,xk
 (8.1)
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The base case h′ = 0 holds trivially. The inductive step uses the fact that for all h′ =
1, . . . , h:
Ah′−1 ·Dh′,xh′ = Sˆh′,xh′ ·Ah′ + Eh′,xh′
From the homomorphic property of γ we can deduce that
h∏
i=1
Sˆi,xi =
h∏
i=1
γ(Mi,xi ,Si,xi) = γ(Mx,Sx)
Finally, we bound the error term as follows:
‖A0 ·Dx − γ(Mx,Sx) ·Ah‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
h∑
j=1
j−1∏
i=1
(Sˆi,xi) ·Ej,xj ·
h∏
k=j+1
Dk,xk
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ h · √t · σ ·
(√
t ·max
i,b
‖γ(Mi,b,Si,b)‖ · σ ·
√
m
)h−1
≤ h ·
(
max
i,b
‖γ(Mi,b,Si,b)‖ · σ ·m
)h
Looking ahead, in the applications we will set the parameters to ensure that the thresh-
old B := h · (mσ ·maxi,b ‖γ(Mi,b,Si,b)‖)h is relatively small compared to the modulus q.
Remark 8.3 (Dimensions of Ah). The constructions and analyses in this article can be
obviously generalized to the cases where the dimensions of the matrices are more flexible.
As an example, the matrix Ah can be chosen from Ztq instead of Zt×mq (as a result, Dh,0,
Dh,1 are from Zm instead of Zm×m). For the ease of presentation we keep all the A matrices
with the same dimension, all the D matrices with the same dimension, and mention the
exceptions as they arise.
8.2 Semantic security
Intuitively, semantic security says that for all M, the output of the γ-GGH15 encod-
ings A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} hides {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, for random choices of {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
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and A0, . . . ,Ah. We consider a more general notion parameterized by some fixed func-
tion aux of {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,A0, . . . ,Ah, and we require that aux, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} hides
{Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
Definition 8.4 (Semantic security with auxiliary input). We say that the γ-GGH15 encod-
ings satisfies semantic security with auxiliary input aux for a family of matricesM⊆ Zw×w
if for all {Mi,b ∈M}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, we have
aux, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ≈c aux,
{
(Dm×mZ,σ )i,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
where
Si,b ← Dn×nZ,σ ,Ah ← U(Zt×mq ),
{Di,b} ← ggh.encode(γ, {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} , {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah),
and aux is a fixed function of {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,A0, . . . ,Ah.
Whether the semantic security holds or not varies significantly depending on the choices
of γ, M, and the auxiliary input given to the adversary. In the next few chapters we will
study the semantic security of γ-GGH15 w.r.t. a few specific distributions.
Chapter 9
Private Constrained PRF for Permutation
Branching Programs
In this chapter we construct private constrained PRF for permutation branching programs.
The construction is based on γ⊗-GGH15. The majority of the analysis lies in the proof of
semantic security for γ⊗-GGH15 with permutation matrices.
9.1 New LWE-friendly distributions
As a preparation we show new LWE-friendly secret distributions related to permutation
matrices.
Lemma 9.1. For n,m,w, q ∈ N, σ ∈ R+. Fix a permutation matrix M ∈ {0, 1}w×w. Let
s← θ1×n, A← piwn×m, E← χw×m. If LWEn,wm,q,θ,pi,χ is hard, then (A, (M⊗ s) ·A + E)
is indistinguishable from piwn×m × U(Zw×mq ).
Proof. Fix a permutation matrix M ∈ {0, 1}w×w. Suppose there is a p.p.t. distinguisher
D between samples from
(A, (M⊗ s) ·A + E) , where s← θ1×n,A← piwn×m,E← χw×m,
and piwn×m × U(Zw×mq ); then we build a distinguisher D′ for LWEn,wm,q,θ,pi,χ.
The distinguisher D′ is given an LWEn,wm,q,θ,pi,χ instance
(A′,Y′) =
([
A(1) | ... | A(w)
]
,
[
Y(1) | ... | Y(w)
])
,
58
where A(i) ∈ Zn×m,Y(i) ∈ Z1×m i ∈ [w]. It then rearranges the blocks as (U,V) ∈
Zwn×m×Zw×m, where the ith block (each block has n rows) of U is Ai, the ith row of V is
Yi. D
′ then sends (U,M ·V) to D. Due to the permutation structure of M, (U,M ·V) is
an LWE sample if (A′,Y′) is an LWE sample, or from the random distribution if (A′,Y′)
is from the random distribution. Hence D′ wins with the same advantage as D.
9.2 Semantic security for γ⊗-GGH15 with permutation matrices
In this section, we prove semantic security of the γ⊗-GGH15 encodings (cf. Construc-
tion 8.1) for permutation matricesM. The security is based on the LWE assumption, and
holds even when the adversary is given {Ai}i∈{0,1,...,h} as the auxiliary input.
Theorem 9.2. The γ⊗-GGH15 encodings in Construction 8.1 satisfies semantic security
with auxiliary input aux = {Ai}i∈{0,1,...,h} for M being the set of w-dimensional permuta-
tion matrices, assuming LWEn,wm,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,
Proof. For t, n, w ∈ N such that t = nw. For the sake of completeness we spell out the
details of the real and simulated distributions which will be proven indistinguishable.
The real and simulated distributions. In the real distribution the adversary is given
A0,
{
Di,b ,Mi,b,Ai
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
where
• {Ai, τi ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q)}i∈{0,1,...,h−1} ,Ah ← U(Zt×mq )
• Si,b ← Dn×nZ,σ .
• Di,b ← A−1i−1 ((Mi,b ⊗ Si,b) ·Ai + Ei,b), where Ei,b ← χt×m.
The simulated distribution is
A0,
{
Vi,b ,Mi,b,Ai
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
59
where
• {Ai ← U(Zt×mq )}i∈{0,1,...,h}.
• Vi,b ← Dm×mZ,σ .
To show that the real distribution is computationally indistinguishable from the simu-
lated one, we introduce the following intermediate distributions.
Distributions i, for i ∈ {h+ 1, h, ..., 1}. Let Distribution h + 1 be identical to the
real distribution. For i = h down to 1, let Distribution i be the same to Distribution
i+ 1, except that Ai−1, Di,0, Di,1 are sampled differently. Let Ai−1 ← U(Zt×mq ). Sample
Di,b ← Dm×mZ,σ , b ∈ {0, 1}.
Lemma 9.3. For i ∈ [h], Dist. i+ 1 ≈c Dist. i assuming LWEn,wm,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ .
Proof. We introduce an intermediate distribution i∗, which is generated in the same way
as Distribution i+ 1, except that Di,0, Di,1 are sampled as:
Di,b ← A−1i−1 (Ui,b, σ) , b ∈ {0, 1}.
where (Ui,0,Ui,1)← U(Zt×mq × Zt×mq ).
The intermediate distribution i∗ is statistically close to Distribution i due to Lemma 4.14.
It remains to prove that Distribution i∗ is computationally indistinguishable from Distri-
bution i + 1. This follows Lemma 9.1, by treating Mi,0 ⊗ Si,0, Mi,1 ⊗ Si,1 as the LWE
secret, Ai as the public matrice. Note that Ai is sampled uniformly without a trapdoor in
Distributions i+ 1 and i∗.
Formally, if there’s an adversary A that distinguishes Distributions i+1 and i∗, we build
a distinguisher A′ for LWEn,wm,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ as follows. Once given the LWE challenge
Ai, [Yi,0 | Yi,1] ∈ Zt×m × Zt×2m
The LWE distinguisher A′ proceeds as follows:
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1. Sample
{
Sk,b ← Dn×nZ,σ
}
k∈[i−1],b∈{0,1}
.
2. For k ∈ {0, 1, ..., i− 1}, sample Ak, τk ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q). For k ∈ {i+ 1, ..., h},
sample Ak ← U(Zt×mq ).
3. For k ∈ {0, 1, ..., i− 1} , b ∈ {0, 1}, sample Dk,b ← A−1k−1 ((Mk,b ⊗ Sk,b) ·Ai + Ek,b, σ)
using τk, where Ek,b ← Dt×mZ,σ . For k ∈ {i+ 1, ..., h} , b ∈ {0, 1}, sample Dk,b ←
Dm×mZ,σ .
The LWE distinguisher A′ then sends
A0,
{
Dk,b ,Mk,b,Ak
}
k∈[h],b∈{0,1}
to the adversary A. If A says it is Dist. i+ 1, it corresponds to the LWE samples; if A says
Dist. i∗, it corresponds to the random distribution.
Theorem 9.2 follows from Lemma 9.3.
9.3 Private constrained PRF for permutation branching programs
In this section we construct private constrained PRFs for permutation branching programs.
For the ease of presentation we make the following notation conventions that are only
applicable Section 9.3. For n,w ∈ N, let t = wn. For a matrix X ∈ Zt×∗, for i ∈ [w], let
X(i) denote the ((i− 1)n+ 1)th to (in)th rows of X.
Construction 9.4 (PCPRF for permutation branching programs). For a class of permu-
tation matrix branching programs G$,w that satisfies Definition 6.3, construct a family of
private constraint PRFs for G$,w as follows.
Key Gen. Gen(1λ, 1`,G$,w) parses parameters h,w ∈ N, from G$,w.
Sample parameters n,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ ∈ R+ according to Remark 9.5.
Sample {Si,b ← χn×n}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, Ah
$← Zt×mq . Let MSK := {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah.
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Eval. Eval(MSK, x) parses MSK as {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, on input x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
⌊
S$(x) ·A(1)h
⌉
p
∈ Zn×mp .
Constrain. Constrain(1λ,MSK,Γ) parses MSK as {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, the permutation
matrices in Γ as {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, computes
(A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1})← ggh.encode(γ⊗, {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} , {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, σ)
and outputs
CKΓ = J ·A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} .
where J = e1 ⊗ In×n ∈ {0, 1}n×t.
Constrain Eval. Constrain.Eval(CKΓ, x) parses CKΓ = J ·A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, on input
x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs ⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
.
Remark 9.5 (Parameters). The parameters n,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ ∈ R+ are sampled under
the following constraints for correctness and security. m = Ω(t log q), σ = Ω(
√
t log q)
for trapdoor functionality due to Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.13. n = λ, χ = DZ,2
√
λ for
security due to Lemma 4.10 and Lemma 4.9. The noise threshold B is set according to
Lemma 8.2
B ≥ w · h · (mσ2 · √nw)h ≥ w · h · (wλ log q)2.5h .
Let  ∈ (0, 1). q and p are chosen s.t. q ≥ p ·B ·ω(poly(λ)) for correctness, q ≤ (σ/λ) ·2λ1−
for security due to Lemma 4.9.
Theorem 9.6 (Functionality and correctness). There exists j ∈ {2, ..., w} s.t. for all
62
x ∈ {0, 1}`, with all but negligible probability
⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
=

⌊
S$(x) ·A(1)h
⌉
p
if C(x) = 1⌊
S$(x) ·A(j)h
⌉
p
if C(x) = 0
. (9.1)
Proof. From Lemma 8.2,
‖J·A0 ·D$(x)−(e1⊗I)·(M$(x)⊗S$(x))·Ah‖∞ = ‖J·A0 ·D$(x)−
(
(e1M$(x))⊗ S$(x)
)·Ah‖∞ ≤ B
(9.2)
By the setting of parameters qp·B = ω(poly(λ)), we have that for all x ∈ {0, 1}`, with all
but negligible probability,
⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
=
⌊(
(e1M$(x))⊗ S$(x)
) ·Ah⌉p =

⌊
S$(x) ·A(1)h
⌉
p
if C(x) = 1⌊
S$(x) ·A(j)h
⌉
p
if C(x) = 0
.
(9.3)
where the second equality follows Definition 6.3.
Next we prove Construction 9.4 satisfies constraint-hiding and pseudorandomness prop-
erties (cf. Definition 3.5), where we restrict all the evaluation queries are made after the
constrained-key query.
Theorem 9.7. Construction 9.4 is a PCPRF assuming LWEn,2m,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ .
Proof. The simulator Sim(1λ) proceeds as follows:
1. Given the constrained key query, Sim samples
U← U(Zn×mq ),
{
Di,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
outputs U, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} as the simulated constrained key.
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2. Given an input query x with indicator dx, Sim outputs
FSim(x) =

⌊
U ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1
Y ← U(Zn×mp ) if dx = 0
.
To prove the real experiment is indistinguishable from the simulated one, we introduce
an intermediate simulator Sim∗, which differs from Sim in the response to the evaluation
queries. Sim∗(1λ) proceeds as follows:
1. Given the constrained key query, Sim∗ samples
U1,U2 ← U(Zn×mq ),
{
Di,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
outputs U1, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} as the simulated constrained key.
2. Given an input query x with indicator dx (either before or after the constrained key
query), Sim∗ outputs
FSim∗(x) =

⌊
U1 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1⌊
U2 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 0
.
Lemma 9.8. The real distribution is indistinguishable from the output of Sim∗ assuming
LWEn,wm,q,DZ,σ ,U(Zq),DZ,σ .
Proof. We show if there exists a distinguisher A for the output distributions of the real
world versus Sim∗, we build a distinguisher A′ for the experiments in Lemma 9.2 as follows
1. Once Amakes a constrained key query with the matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} from Γ$,w,
A′ calls for a sample from the experiments in Lemma 9.2 , get back {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
sampled either from the real (γ⊗-GGH15 encoding) or the Gaussian distribution, with
auxiliary input A0. A
′ then responses with (e1 ⊗ In×n) ·A0 and {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
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2. Once A makes an evaluation query x with indicator dx, A
′ responses with

⌊
(e1 ⊗ In×n) ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1⌊
(e2 ⊗ In×n) ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 0
.
We check if A′ produces the correct distributions. First, observe that (e1 ⊗ In×n) ·A0 is
statistically close to both U1 from the output of Sim
∗ and the J·A0 in the real distribution.
Next, we claim that A′ responses of evaluation queries is correct. For those inputs x
such that C(x) = 1, the responses are correct up to negligible statistical error due to
Theorem 9.6. For those inputs x such that C(x) = 0, the responses distribute identically
to the output of Sim∗; for the outputs on x such that C(x) = 0 in the real world, we have
⌊
S$(x) ·A(1)h
⌉
p
=
⌊(
e2 ⊗ In×n
) · (M$(x) ⊗ S$(x)) ·Ah⌉p ≈s ⌊(e2 ⊗ In×n) ·A0 ·D$(x)⌉p
(9.4)
where the first equality follows Definition 6.3.
Therefore, if {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are sampled the real distribution (γ⊗-GGH15 encoding),
then the output of A′ corresponds to the real world distribution; if {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are
sampled the Gaussian distribution, then the output of A′ corresponds to the output of
Sim∗. We conclude that the advantage of A′ is the same of the advantage of A.
Lemma 9.9. The output of Sim∗ is indistinguishable from the output of Sim assuming
LWEm,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Proof. The constrained keys simulated by Sim∗ and Sim are the same. It remains to prove
the PRF evaluations produced by Sim∗ on input x such that C(x) = 0 are indistinguishable
from uniformly random. This follows immediately from Lemma 5.6 by treating U2 as the
PRF secret key.
The proof completes by combining the Lemmas 9.8 and 9.9.
Chapter 10
New Lemmas for Lattice Preimage Sampling
In this chapter we present extensions of the trapdoor sampling lemma from Gentry, Peikert
and Vaikuntanathan [58].
10.1 Statistical closeness of standard and oblique preimage sampling
The first is a statistical lemma. It says when the image vector can be partitioned into two
parts, one is a uniformly random vector u, the other is an arbitrary vector z, the preimages
obtained from standard and oblique trapdoor samplings are statistically indistinguishable:
(
A,A−1
(
z
u
)) ≈s (A,A−1(z))
where the distributions are over the randomness of u and the coins of A−1(·) and A−1(·).
Lemma 10.1. Let  > 0. Given σ ∈ R+, n′, n,m, q ∈ N. For all but a q−2n′ fraction
of A ∈ Zn′×mq , all but a q−2n fraction of A ∈ Zn×mq , let A :=
(
A
A
)
. For σ > η(Λ
⊥(A)),
m ≥ 9(n′ + n) log q. For a fixed z ∈ Zn′q , for u← U(Znq ), we have
A−1(
(
z
u
)
, σ) and A
−1
(z, σ)
are 2-statistically close.
Proof. We need two lemmas to assist the proof of Lemma 10.1.
Lemma 10.2. Let c > 9. For n′, n,m, q ∈ N such that m ≥ c(n′ + n) log q. For
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all but q−2n′ fraction of A ∈ Zn′×mq , all but q−2n fraction of A ∈ Zn×mq , we have{
A · x | x ∈ {0, 1}m ∩ Λ⊥(A)} = Znq .
Proof. From Lemma 4.8, we have for all but q−2n′ fraction of A ∈ Zn′×mq
∣∣∣∣ Prx∈{0,1}m[A · x = 0n′ ]− q−n′
∣∣∣∣ < 2q−2n′ ⇒ Prx∈{0,1}m[A · x = 0n′ ] > 0.99 · q−n′ (10.1)
Let x ← U({0, 1}m ∩ Λ⊥(A)), we have H∞(x) > m − 2n′ log q. For δ > 0, by setting
m ≥ n log q + 2n′ log q + 2 log(1/δ), we have that for A← U(Zn×mq ),
(A,A · x) and (A, U(Znq ))
are δ-statistically close following leftover hash lemma (cf. Lemma 2.3).
Then Lemma 10.2 follows by setting δ = q−4n and take a union bound for A.
Lemma 10.3. For n′, n,m, q ∈ N, σ > 0. A ∈ Zn′×mq , A ∈ Zn×mq . Assuming the columns
of A :=
(
A
A
)
generate Zn′+nq . For any vectors u ∈ Znq , z ∈ Zn
′
q , and c ∈ Zm where A·c =
(
z
u
)
mod q. The conditional distribution D of x ← c + DΛ⊥(A),σ,−c given Ax = u mod q is
exactly c +DΛ⊥(A),σ,−c.
Proof. Observe that the support of D is c + Λ⊥(A). We compute the distribution D: for
all x ∈ c + Λ⊥(A),
D(x) =
ρσ(x)
ρσ(c + Λ⊥(A))
=
ρσ,−c(x− c)
ρσ,−c(Λ⊥(A))
= DΛ⊥(A),σ,−c(x− c). (10.2)
Finally from Lemma 4.4, let Λ = Λ⊥(A), Λ′ = Λ⊥(A), we have Λ′ ⊆ Λ. Since
σ > η(Λ
′), DΛ⊥(A),σ,−c is 2-statistically close to uniform over the cosets of the quotient
group (Λ⊥(A)/Λ⊥(A)). The rest of the proof of Lemma 10.1 follows Lemma 10.3 and
Lemma 10.2.
67
10.2 Gaussian preimage with a hidden function
The second is a computational lemma which states that for any matrix Z, the following
two distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
A−1(Z + E) ≈c A−1(U)
where the distributions are over random private choices of A,E and U and the coins of
A−1(·). The indistinguishability crucially relies on the fact that the “function” A is hidden,
otherwise the adversary can simply distinguish by evaluation.
Lemma 10.4. Given n,m, k, q ∈ N, σ ∈ R such that n,m, k ∈ poly(λ), m ≥ 4n log q,
σ ≥ 2√n log q. For arbitrary matrix Z ∈ Zn×kq , the following two distributions are compu-
tationally indistinguishable assuming LWEm,k,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Dist. 1 Let A, τ ← TrapSam(1n, 1m, q), E← Dn×kZ,σ . Sample D← A−1(Z + E, σ) using τ .
Output D.
Dist. 2 Sample D = Dm×kZ,σ . Output D.
The proof uses the Bonsai technique [40].
Lemma 10.5 (Bonsai technique for lattice [40]). Let n,m,m1,m2, q ∈ N, σ ∈ R satisfy
m = m1+m2, m2 ≥ 2n log q, σ > 2
√
n log q. For any y ∈ Znq , the following two distributions
are efficiently samplable and statistically close.
1. Let (A, τ)← TrapSam(1n, 1m, q), d← A−1(y, σ). Output (A,d).
2. Let A1 ← U(Zn×m1q ), (A2, τ2)← TrapSam(1n, 1m2 , q); d1 ← DZm1 ,σ, d2 ← A−12 (y −
A1 · d1, σ). Let A = [A1,A2], d = [dT1 ,dT2 ]T . Output (A,d).
Proof of Lemma 10.4: We prove a stronger statement where the computational indistin-
guishability holds even when Z is given to the adversary. Let m = m1 + m2 such that
m1,m2 ≥ 2n log q. We introduce 2 intermediate distributions,
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Dist. 1.1 Let A1 ← U(Zn×m1q ), (A2, τ2) ← TrapSam(1n, 1m2 , q). Sample D1 ← Dm1×kZ,σ .
Let E← Dn×kZ,σ , sample D2 ← A−12 ((−A1 ·D1 +E+Z), σ) using τ2. Let D :=
D1
D2
.
Output D.
Dist. 1.2 Let A1 ← U(Zn×m1q ), (A2, τ2) ← TrapSam(1n, 1m2 , q). Sample D1 ← Dm1×kZ,σ .
Let U ← U(Zn×kq ), sample D2 ← A−12 ((U + Z), σ) using τ2. Let D :=
D1
D2
.
Output D.
Then Distributions 1 and 1.1 are statistically close following Lemma 10.5. Distributions 2
and 1.2 are statistically close following Lemma 4.14.
It remains to prove that Dist. 1.1 ≈c Dist. 1.2 assuming LWEm1,k,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ . This
follows by taking (D1,−A1 ·D1 + E) as the LWE sample, where A1 is the concatenation
of n independent uniform secret vectors, D1 is the low-norm public matrix and E is the
error matrix.
Formally, suppose there exists a p.p.t. distinguisher A for Dist. 1.1 and Dist. 1.2, we
build a distinguisher A′ for LWEm1,k,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ . Given the challenge sample (D1,Y1),
A′ runs (A2, τ2) ← TrapSam(1n, 1m2 , q), samples D2 ← A−12 ((Y1 + Z), σ) using τ2, send
D :=
D1
D2
 to the adversary A. If A says it is from Dist. 1.1, then A′ chooses “LWE”; if
A says Dist. 1.2, then A′ chooses “random”. The success probability of A′ is same to the
success probability of A.
Chapter 11
Private Constrained PRF for General Branching
Programs
In this chapter we construct private constrained PRF for general branching programs.
The construction is based on γdiag encoding of GGH15. The majority of the analysis
lies in the proof of semantic security for γdiag-GGH15 and γ⊗diag-GGH15 encodings in
Construction 8.1 under the LWE assumption, where
γdiag(M,S) =
M
S
 , γ⊗diag(M,S) =
M⊗ S
S
 .
In fact, we show that this holds given auxiliary input about A0 and {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}.
11.1 Definition for S-dependent semantic security
S-dependent security. Concretely, we will derive semantic security of γ⊗diag from that
of γdiag by showing that the construction γdiag satisfies a stronger notion of S-dependent
security where the matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} may depend on {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}:
Definition 11.1 (S-dependent semantic security with auxiliary input). We say that the
γ-GGH15 encodings satisfies S-dependent semantic security with auxiliary input aux for a
family of matricesM⊆ Zw×w if for every polynomial-size circuit f : (Zn×n)2h →M2h, we
have
aux, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ≈c aux,
{
(Dm×mZ,σ )i,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
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where
Si,b ← Dn×nZ,σ ,Ah ← U(Zt×mq ), {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} = f({Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}),
{Di,b} ← ggh.encode(γ, {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} , {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah)
and aux is a fixed function of {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,A0, . . . ,Ah.
Theorem 11.2 (S-dependent semantic security of γdiag). Assuming LWEn,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ ,
the γdiag-GGH15 encodings in Construction 8.1 satisfies S-dependent semantic security for
M = Zw×w with auxiliary input
aux = {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,J ·A0,Ah
where Ah ∈ Zw×mq is the top w rows of Ah and J ∈ {0, 1}n×(t−n) | In×n.
Remark 11.3 (Necessity of JA0). Ideally, we would liked to have shown that semantic
security holds with auxiliary input A0 (as opposed to JA0). However, such a statement is
false for general M ∈ Zw×w. Concretely, given A0,D1,0, we can compute A0 ·D1,0 which
leaks information about the structure of M1,0. In particular, we can distinguish between1 0
0 1
 and
0 1
0 1
.
As an immediate corollary, we then have:
Corollary 11.4 (semantic security of γ⊗diag). Assuming LWEn,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ , the
γ⊗diag-GGH15 encodings in Construction 8.1 satisfies semantic security for M = Zw×w
with auxiliary input
aux = {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,J ·A0,Ah
where Ah ∈ Zwn×mq is the top wn rows of Ah and J ∈ {0, 1}n×(t−n) | In×n.
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11.2 Proof of S-dependent semantic security for γdiag-GGH15
Proof of Theorem 11.2. For t, n, w ∈ N such that t = w+ n. For any matrix X ∈ Zt×∗, let
X =
X
X
, where X ∈ Zw×∗, X ∈ Zn×∗. For the sake of completeness we spell out the
details of the real and simulated distributions which will be proven indistinguishable.
The real and simulated distributions. In the real distribution the adversary is given
J ·A0,
{
Di,b ,Si,b,Mi,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,Ah
where
• {Ai, τi ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q)}i∈{0,1,...,h−1} ,Ah ← U(Zt×mq )
• Si,b ← Dn×nZ,σ , {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ← f({Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1})
• Di,b ← A−1i−1
Mi,bAi + Ei,b
Si,bAi + Ei,b
 ,Ei,b ← χt×m
The simulated distribution is generated in the same way except that the adversary is
given
J ·A0,
{
Vi,b ,Si,b,Mi,b
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,Ah
where Vi,b ← Dm×mZ,σ .
To show that the real distribution is computationally indistinguishable from the simu-
lated one, we introduce the following intermediate distributions.
Distributions 1.i, for i ∈ {h+ 1, h, ..., 1}. Let Distribution 1.(h + 1) be identical to
the real distribution. For i = h down to 1, let Distributions 1.i be the same to Distribu-
tions 1.(i + 1), except that Ai−1, Di,0, Di,1 are sampled differently. Let (Ai−1, τi−1) ←
TrapSam(1w, 1m, q), Ai−1 ← U(Zn×mq ). Sample Di,b ← A−1i−1((Mi,bAi+Ei,b), σ) using τi−1,
b ∈ {0, 1}.
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Distributions 2.0. Distribution 2.0 is sampled identically to Distribution 1.1, except
that J·A0 is replaced with a uniformly random matrix U $← Zn×m. Since J ∈ {0, 1}n×(t−n) |
In×n, U ≈s J ·A0 for A0, τ0 ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q) due to Lemma 4.12.
Distributions 2.j, for j ∈ {1, ..., h}. For j = 1, 2, ..., h, let Distributions 2.j be the same
to Distributions 2.(j − 1), except that Dj,0, Dj,1 are sampled simply from Dm×mZ,σ . Note
that Dist. 2.h is identical to the simulated distribution, except that in Dist. 2.h, U
$← Zn×m
is in the place where J ·A0 is in the simulated distribution, so they are statistically close
again due to Lemma 4.12.
The sequence. We will show that:
Real = 1.(h+ 1) ≈c 1.h ≈c · · · ≈c 1.1 ≈s 2.0 ≈c 2.1 ≈c · · · ≈c 2.h ≈s Simulated
In particular, the ≈c’s will rely on the LWE assumption, using A1, . . . ,A` as LWE secrets
in the following order: A`, . . . ,A1,A0, . . . ,A`−1.
Lemma 11.5. For i ∈ [h], Dist. 1.(i+ 1) ≈c Dist. 1.i assuming LWEn,2n,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Roughly speaking, we will show that for all i ∈ [h],
A−1i−1
Mi,bAi + Ei,b
Si,bAi + Ei,b

b∈{0,1}
≈c
{
A
−1
i−1(Mi,bAi + Ei,b)
}
b∈{0,1}
where the distinguisher is also given Ai−1, τi−1,Si,0,Si,1,Mi,0,Mi,1,Ai, but not Ai, so that
we can treat Ai as a LWE secret, cf. Lemma 10.4.
Proof. We introduce an intermediate distribution 1.i∗, which is generated in the same way
as Distributions 1.(i+ 1), except that Di,0, Di,1 are sampled as:
Di,b ← A−1i−1
Mi,bAi + Ei,b
Ui,b
 , σ
 , b ∈ {0, 1}.
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where (Ui,0,Ui,1)← U(Zn×mq × Zn×mq ).
The intermediate distribution 1.i∗ is statistically close to Dist. 1.i due to Lemma 10.1.
It remains to prove that 1.i∗ is computationally indistinguishable from Distribution 1.(i+1).
This follows Lemma 4.11, by treating Ai as the LWE secret, and Si,0,Si,1 as the public
matrices.
Formally, if there’s an adversary A that distinguishes Distributions 1.(i + 1) and 1.i∗,
we build a distinguisher A′ for LWEn,2n,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ as follows. Once given the LWE
challenge
Si,0,Si,1,Yi,0,Yi,1
where Si,0,Si,1 are the low-norm public matrices, Yi,0,Yi,1 are either the LWE samples
with the common secret Ai ← U(Zn×mq ), or independent uniform samples from Zn×mq ×
Zn×mq . The LWE distinguisher A′ proceeds as follows:
1. Sample
{
Sk,b ← Dn×nZ,σ
}
k∈[h],k 6=i,b∈{0,1}
.
2. For k ∈ [h], b ∈ {0, 1}, compute Mk,b ∈ Zw×w using f({Sk,b}k∈[h],b∈{0,1}).
3. For k ∈ {0, 1, ..., i− 1}, sample Ak, τk ← TrapSam(1t, 1m, q). For k ∈ {i, ..., h− 1},
sample Ak, τ¯k ← TrapSam(1w, 1m, q). Sample Ah ← U(Zt×mq ).
4. For k ∈ [h], b ∈ {0, 1}, samples
Dk,b ←

A−1k−1
(Mk,bAk+Ek,b
Sk,bAk+Ek,b
)
using τk−1 if k ≤ i− 1
A−1i−1
(Mi,bAi+Ei,b
Yi,b
)
using τi−1 if k = i
A
−1
k−1(Mk,bAk + Ek,b)) using τ¯k−1 if k ≥ i+ 1
with standard deviation σ.
The LWE distinguisher A′ then sends
J ·A0,
{
Dk,b ,Sk,b,Mk,b
}
k∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,Ah.
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to the adversary A. If A says it is Dist. 1.(i+ 1), it corresponds to the LWE samples with
low-norm public matrices; if A says Dist. 1.i∗, it corresponds to the uniform distribution.
Lemma 11.6. For j ∈ [h], Dist. 2.(j− 1) ≈c Dist. 2.j assuming LWEm,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Roughly speaking, we will show that for all j ∈ [h],
{
A
−1
j−1(Mj,bAj + Ej,b)
}
b∈{0,1}
≈c
{
Dm×mZ,σ
}
b∈{0,1}
where the distinguisher is also given Mj,0,Mj,1,Aj , but not Aj−1, so as to use Lemma 10.4.
Proof. For j ∈ [h], suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes Distribu-
tions 2.(j−1) and 2.j, we build a distinguisher A′ for Distributions 1 and 2 in Lemma 10.4
as follows. Given challenging samples
Dj,0 | Dj,1 ∈ Zm×2m
either obtained from A
−1
j−1(
[
Mj,0Aj + Ej,0 |Mj,1Aj + Ej,1
]
) which corresponds to Dist. 1
in Lemma 10.4 (by treating
[
Mj,0Aj |Mj,1Aj
]
as the arbitrary matrix Z); or from Dm×2mZ,σ
which corresponds to Dist. 2 in Lemma 10.4. The distinguisher A′ proceeds as follows:
1. For k ∈ [h], b ∈ {0, 1}, sample Sk,b ← Dn×nZ,σ .
2. For k ∈ [h], b ∈ {0, 1}, compute Mk,b ∈ Zw×w using f({Sk,b}k∈[h],b∈{0,1}).
3. For k ∈ {j, j + 1, ..., h− 1}, sample Ak, τ¯k ← TrapSam(1w, 1m, q). Sample Ah ←
U(Zt×mq ).
4. For k ∈ {1, 2, ..., j − 1, j + 1, ..., h} , b ∈ {0, 1}, samples
Dk,b ←

Dm×mZ,σ if k ≤ j − 1
A
−1
k−1(Mk,bAk + Ek,b, σ) using τ¯k−1 if k ≥ j + 1
.
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5. Sample U← U(Zn×mq ).
A′ then sends
U,
{
Dk,b ,Sk,b,Mk,b
}
k∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,Ah.
to the adversary A. Note that A′ correctly produce the output without Aj−1. So if
A determines that the samples are from Distribution 2.(j − 1), A′ chooses Dist. 1 in
Lemma 10.4; if A determines that the samples are from Distribution 2.j, A′ chooses Dist. 2
in Lemma 10.4.
Theorem 11.2 follows from Lemmas 11.5 and 11.6.
11.3 Private constrained PRF for general branching programs
We construct private constrained PRF for general branching programs. For the ease of
presentation we make the following notation conventions that are only applicable in Sec-
tion 11.3. For n, t, w ∈ N s.t. t = wn + n, for a matrix X ∈ Zt×∗, let X =
X
X
 s.t.
X ∈ Z(wn)×∗, X ∈ Zn×∗.
Construction 11.7 (PCPRF for general branching programs). For a class of matrix
branching programs Gv,$,w that satisfies Definition 6.5, construct a family of private con-
straint PRFs for Gv,$,w as follows.
Key Gen. Gen(1λ, 1`,Gv,$,w) parses parameters h,w ∈ N, v ∈ {0, 1}1×w from Gv,$,w.
Sample parameters n,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ ∈ R+ according to Remark 11.8.
Sample {Si,b ← χn×n}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, Ah
$← Zt×mq . Let MSK := {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah.
Eval. Eval(MSK, x) parses MSK as {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, on input x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs
⌊
S$(x) ·Ah
⌉
p
.
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Constrain. Constrain(1λ,MSK,Γ) parses MSK as {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, the matrices in Γ
as {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, computes
(A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1})← ggh.encode(γ⊗diag, {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} , {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,Ah, σ)
and outputs
CKΓ = J ·A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} .
where J = (v ⊗ In×n | In×n) ∈ {0, 1}n×t.
Constrain Eval. Constrain.Eval(CKΓ, x) parses CKΓ = J ·A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}, on input
x ∈ {0, 1}`, outputs ⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
.
Remark 11.8 (Parameters). The parameters n,m, p, q, B ∈ N, σ ∈ R+ are sampled under
the following constraints for correctness and security. m = Ω(t log q), σ = Ω(
√
t log q) for
trapdoor functionality due to Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.13. n = Ω(λ log q), χ = DZ,2
√
λ
for security due to Lemma 4.11 and Lemma 4.9. The noise threshold B is set according to
Lemma 8.2
B ≥ (w + 1) · h ·
(
mσ2 ·
√
n(w + 1)
)h ≥ (w + 1) · h · ((w + 1)λ log2 q)2.5h .
Let  ∈ (0, 1). q and p are chosen s.t. q ≥ p ·B ·ω(poly(λ)) for correctness, q ≤ (σ/λ) ·2λ1−
for security due to Lemma 4.9.
Theorem 11.9 (Functionality and correctness). For all x ∈ {0, 1}`, with all but negligible
probability
‖J ·A0 ·D$(x) −
(
S$(x) ·Ah + (v ⊗ I) · (M$(x) ⊗ S$(x)) ·Ah
) ‖∞ ≤ B (11.1)
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For x ∈ {0, 1}` such that C(x) = 1, with all but negligible probability
⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
=
⌊
S$(x) ·Ah
⌉
p
.
Proof. The first statement follows Lemma 8.2. The second statement follows the setting
of parameter q = p · B · ω(poly(λ)), and Def. 6.5 which says when C(x) = 1, we have
vM$(x) = 0
1×w.
Example 11.10. For CNFs with ` variables, w clauses, encode them using Construc-
tion 6.6. Let v = 11×w, the resulting branching program satisfies the criteria for construct-
ing PCPRFs.
Example 11.11. The puncturing functionality fx∗(x) = (x 6= x∗) can be instantiated
with CNF with a single clause of disjunctions. To puncture on a point x∗ ∈ {0, 1}`, let
Ψ = (x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ ...∨ x¯`). Concretely, we can take w = 1 and let v = 1,Mi,x∗i = 1,Mi,1−x∗i =
0,P1 = 0,P0 = 1, so that
Mx =

0 if x 6= x∗
1 if x = x∗
.
Next we prove Construction 11.7 satisfies Definition 3.5, where we restrict all the eval-
uation queries are made after the constrained-key query.
Theorem 11.12. Construction 11.7 is a PCPRF assuming LWEn,poly,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Proof overview. In the security proof, we will use the fact that whenever fΓ(x) = 0,
constrained evaluation outputs SxA
(∗)
` + SxA` (where ∗ represents at least one of the ν
output indices), so that the normal PRF output is masked by the boxed term. We consider
the following sequence of games:
• Replace the output of the Eval oracle with
(A
(∗)
0 + A0) ·Dx − Sx ·A(∗)`
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This is statistically indistinguishable from the real game, since (A
(∗)
0 + A0) ·Dx ≈
Sx ·A(∗)` + Sx ·A`.
• Apply semantic security to replace (Di,0,Di,0)i∈[`] with random. Here, we require that
semantic security holds even if the distinguisher gets {Si,b}i∈[`],b∈{0,1} ,A`, where the
latter are needed in order to compute Sx ·A(∗)` .
• Now, we can apply the BLMR analysis to deduce pseudorandomness of Sx·A(∗)` , where
we treat A
(∗)
` as the seed of the BLMR PRF [22]. This implies pseudorandomness of
the output of the Eval oracle.
Proof. The simulator Sim(1λ) proceeds as follows:
1. Given the constrained key query, Sim samples U
$← Zn×mq ,
{
Di,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
outputs U, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} as the simulated constrained key.
2. Given an input query x with indicator dx, Sim outputs
FSim(x) =

⌊
U ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1
Y
$← Zn×mp if dx = 0
.
To prove the real experiment is indistinguishable from the simulated one, we introduce
an intermediate simulator Sim∗, which differs from Sim in the response to the evaluation
queries. Sim∗(1λ) proceeds as follows:
1. Given the constrained key query, Sim∗ samples U $← Zn×mq ,
{
Di,b ← Dm×mZ,σ
}
i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
,
outputs U, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} as the simulated constrained key.
2. Given an input query x with indicator dx, Sim
∗ outputs
FSim∗(x) =

⌊
U ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1⌊
U ·D$(x) − (v ⊗ I) · (M$(x) ⊗ S$(x)) ·Ah
⌉
p
if dx = 0
.
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Lemma 11.13. The real distribution is indistinguishable from the output of Sim∗ assuming
LWEn,2m,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
Proof. We prove indistinguishability assuming semantic security of the γ⊗diag-GGH encod-
ings with auxiliary input {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,J ·A0,Ah as shown in Lemma 11.4. That is, we
show if there exists a distinguisher A for the output distributions of the real world versus
Sim∗, we build a distinguisher A′ for the experiments in Lemma 11.4.
1. Once A makes a constraint key query with branching program Γv,$,w, A
′ calls for
a sample from the experiments in Lemma 11.4 with the matrices {Mi,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1}
and vector v from Γv,$,w, get back auxiliary inputs {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,J · A0,Ah,
where J = (v | 1)⊗ In×n and {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} sampled either from the real (GGH15
encoding) or the Gaussian distribution. A′ then send J ·A0, {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} as the
response for the constrained key.
2. Once A makes an evaluation query x with indicator dx, A
′ responses with

⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x)
⌉
p
if dx = 1⌊
J ·A0 ·D$(x) − (v ⊗ I) · (M$(x) ⊗ S$(x)) ·Ah
⌉
p
if dx = 0
.
This is where we use the auxiliary input {Si,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} ,J ·A0,Ah.
First we observe that J ·A0 distributes identically to U from the output of Sim∗. Then
A′ responses of evaluation queries is exactly the same to the responses of Sim∗, and same
to the responses in the real world up to negligible statistical error due to Theorem 11.9.
In addition, if {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are sampled the real distribution (GGH15 encoding), it
corresponds to the distribution in the real constrained key; if {Di,b}i∈[h],b∈{0,1} are sampled
the Gaussian distribution, it corresponds to the output of Sim∗. We conclude that the
advantage of A′ is the same of the advantage of A.
Lemma 11.14. The output of Sim∗ is indistinguishable from the output of Sim assuming
LWEn,poly,q,U(Zq),DZ,σ ,DZ,σ .
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Proof. The constrained keys simulated by Sim∗ and Sim are the same. It remains to prove
the PRF evaluations produced by Sim∗ on input x such that C(x) = 0 are indistinguishable
from uniformly random. To assist the proof we pick σ∗ ∈ R+ s.t. h · (√nσ)h ·ω(poly(λ)) <
σ∗ < qp·ω(poly(λ)) .
For x ∈ {0, 1}` such that C(x) = 0, rearrange the output produced by Sim∗:
FSim∗(x) =
⌊
U ·D$(x) − (v ⊗ I) · (M$(x) ⊗ S$(x)) ·Ah
⌉
p
=
⌊
U ·D$(x) −
(
(v ·M$(x))⊗ S$(x))
) ·Ah⌉p
=
U ·D$(x) − w∑
j=1
(
(v ·M$(x))j · S$(x) ·A(j)h
)
p
≈s
U ·D$(x) − w∑
j=1
(
(v ·M$(x))j · S$(x) ·A(j)h
)
+ Ex

p
(11.2)
where (v ·M$(x))j denotes the jth coordinate of v ·M$(x); A(j)h denotes the ((j−1)n+1)th
to (jn)th rows of Ah; Ex ← Dn×mZ,σ∗ . The setting of σ∗ guarantees the statistical closeness
of the last two distributions.
The functionality of the Type I branching program Γ guarantees that v ·M$(x) ∈
{0, 1}1×w \ {01×w}, which means at least 1 term in the summation is non-zero. Suppose
the non-zero term is j∗, we will use A(j
∗)
h as the secret to trigger Lemma 5.7.
Formally, let X0 :=
{
x[1], ..., x[d]
}
be the set of d = poly(λ) input queries such that
C(x[i]) = 0, ∀i ∈ [d]. We run through w hybrid distributions. In the jth hybrid, j ∈ [w], we
take out the inputs X ∗j :=
{
x∗ | (v ·M$(x∗))j = 1, x∗ ∈ Xj−1
}
, set Xj := Xj−1 \ X ∗j . For
all x∗ ∈ X ∗j , we have
FSim∗(x
∗) ≈s
⌊
Zx∗ − (S$(x∗) ·A(j)h −Ex∗)
⌉
p
≈c bZx∗ −Ux∗ep (11.3)
where Zx∗ denotes the rest of the terms from the last expression of Eqn. (11.2), Ux∗ ←
U(Zn×mq ), independently for each x∗. The last ≈c follows Lemma 5.7 by treating A(j)h as
the secret.
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At the end of hybrid w we finish with an empty set Xw. The proof of Lemma 11.14
concludes.
The proof completes by combining the Lemmas 11.13 and 11.14.
Chapter 12
Upgrade to Private Programmable PRFs
A private programmable PRF, as defined in [23], extends the functionality of a private
puncturable PRF. On a the punctured point x∗, the programmability allows to embed a
specific output value y∗, instead of just a random value as required in the normal punc-
turable PRF definition. We denote the resulting programmed key as k{x∗, y∗}.
In this chapter we show that private programmable PRFs are implied by private punc-
turable PRFs with rerandomization, and the constructions from the previous chapters
can be modified to support rerandomization. This approach was folklore (e.g. from the
discussions in [77]). Now we formalize it.
12.1 Definition of a private programmable PRF
We recall the definition of a private programmable PRF from [23] in the single-key setting.
Definition 12.1 (Private programmable PRF [23]). A family of private programmable
PRFs F = {Fk : Dλ → Rλ}λ∈N is specified by a tuple of efficient functions (Gen, Program,
Eval, Program.Eval).
• The key generation algorithm Gen(1λ) takes the security parameter λ, generates the
master secret key MSK.
• The evaluation algorithm Eval(MSK, x) takes MSK, an input x, outputs FMSK(x).
• The programming algorithm Program(1λ,MSK, x∗, y∗) takes MSK, an input x∗ ∈ Dλ,
an output y∗ ∈ Rλ, outputs a programmed key k {x∗, y∗}.
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• The programmed evaluation algorithm Program.Eval(k {x∗, y∗} , x) takes a programmed
key k {x∗, y∗}, an input x, outputs Fk{x∗,y∗}(x).
F is required to satisfy the following properties.
Functionality. For an input x ∈ Dλ, with probability 1−negl(λ) over the randomness
in algorithms Gen and Program,
Program.Eval(k {x∗, y∗} , x) =

Eval(MSK, x) if x 6= x∗
y∗ if x = x∗
.
Pseudorandomness on the programmed points. Consider the following exper-
iment between a challenger and an adversary. The adversary can ask 3 types of oracle
queries: program oracle, evaluation oracle, and challenge oracle. For b ∈ {0, 1}, the chal-
lenger responds to each oracle query in the following manner:
• Program oracle. Given an input-output pair x∗, y∗, the challenger outputs a pro-
grammed key k {x∗, y∗} ← Program(1λ,MSK, x∗, y∗).
• Evaluation oracle. Given an input x ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs y ← Eval(MSK, x).
• Challenge oracle. Given an input xc ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs y ← Eval(MSK, xc)
if b = 1; outputs y ← U(Rλ) if b = 0.
The challenge query xc must be equal to x
∗, and xc is not sent among evaluation queries.
At the end of the experiment, the adversary chooses b′ and wins if b′ = b. The scheme
satisfies the pseudorandomness property if the winning probability of any p.p.t. adversary
is bounded by 1/2 + negl(λ).
Indistinguishability-based point-hiding. Consider the following experiment be-
tween a challenger and an adversary. The adversary can ask 2 types of oracle queries:
program oracle or evaluation oracle. For b ∈ {0, 1}, the challenger responds to each oracle
query in the following manner:
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• Program oracle. Given two inputs x∗0 and x∗1, the challenger samples a random
y∗ ← U(Rλ), outputs a programmed key: k {x∗b , y∗} ← Program(1λ,MSK, x∗b , y∗).
• Evaluation oracle. Given an input x ∈ Dλ, the challenger outputs Eval(MSK, x).
x∗0 and x∗1 are not allowed to be asked to the evaluation oracle. At the end of the experiment,
the adversary chooses b′ and wins if b′ = b. The scheme is called point-hiding if the winning
probability of any p.p.t. adversary is bounded by 1/2 + negl(λ).
12.2 Rerandomizable puncturability implies programmability
A constraining algorithm is rerandomizable if the output on an input x such that C(x) = 0
is rerandomizable.
Definition 12.2 (Rerandomizability in the constraining algorithm). A constraining algo-
rithm is rerandomizable if for a fixed master secret key MSK, for a constraint C, for all the
x s.t. C(x) = 0, and for any y in the range Rλ:
Pr
r
[ Constrain.Eval(Constrain(1λ,MSK, C; r), x) = y ] = 1/|Rλ|.
Achieving rerandomizable puncturability. For Construction 9.4 and Construc-
tion 11.7, first we restrict the output to be 1-bit (this can be obtained by simply picking 1
bit from the output, or XORing all the output bits.) Then, observe that in both construc-
tions, the output on an input x s.t. C(x) = 0 will select designated rows in Ah that do not
influence the original output. So the simplest way to rerandomize is to rerandomize these
rows in Ah.
Specifically, for Construction 9.4, we can rerandomize all of Ah except A
(1)
h ; for Con-
struction 11.7, we can rerandomize the entire Ah.
The transformation. Next we construct a private programmable PRF from a reran-
domizable private puncturable PRF. For simplicity we only construct a private programmable
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PRF with 1-bit output. The one with m-bit output follows immediately by sampling m
independent keys from the 1-bit solution.
Construction 12.3. Given a rerandomizable private puncturable PRF F : Dλ → {0, 1},
construct a private programmable PRF F ′ : Dλ → {0, 1} as follows.
Key Gen. F ′.Gen(1λ) runs MSK← F .Gen(1λ), set MSK′ = MSK.
Eval. F ′.Eval(MSK′, x) = F .Eval(MSK, x).
Program. F ′.Program(MSK′, x∗, y∗) keeps running k {x∗} ← F .Puncture(MSK, x∗; r) with
fresh randomness r, until F .Puncture.Eval(k {x∗} , x∗) = y∗. Set k {x∗} as the pro-
grammed key k′ {x∗, y∗}.
Program Eval. F ′.Program.Eval(k′ {x∗, y∗} , x) = F .Puncture.Eval(k {x∗} , x).
Theorem 12.4. Construction 12.3 satisfies Definition 12.1.
Proof. The functionality follows immediately from that of F . So does the ind-based point-
hiding property of F ′, since in the game the programmed output is chosen from random
by the challenger, which makes the definition identical to standard private puncturing.
It remains to prove the pseudorandomness on the programmed points. Suppose by
contradiction that there is an adversary A′ that predicts the “real” or “random” in the
pseudorandomness game of F ′ with probability 1/2 + ν(λ) where ν is non-negligible, we
show an adversary A that breaks the pseudorandomness game of F . Once A′ makes a
program query on x∗, y∗ ∈ Dλ × {0, 1}, A makes a puncture key query on x∗, receive a
punctured key k {x∗}. If F .Puncture.Eval(k {x∗} , x∗) = y∗, A continues, sends k {x∗} as
the programmed key to A′; in the end choose “real” or “random” according to the choice of
A′. If F .Puncture.Eval(k {x∗} , x∗) 6= y∗, A aborts the game. Then the success probability
of A is 1/2 + ν(λ)/2, breaking the pseudorandomness game of F .
Chapter 13
Defining Correlation Intractability
We recall the definition of correlation intractability [38].
Definition 13.1 (Density of a binary relations). A binary relation
R = R(λ) ⊆ { (x, y) | x ∈ D(λ), y ∈ C(λ) }
has density µ = µ(λ) if for every x ∈ D(λ) it holds that Pry∈C(λ)[ (x, y) ∈ R(λ) ] < µ(λ).
A relation R is called sparse if it has negligible density.
Definition 13.2 (Correlation intractability w.r.t. binary sparse relations [38]). A family
of functions H = {Hk : D(λ) → C(λ)}λ∈N is correlation intractable w.r.t. binary sparse
relations if for every polynomial-size adversary A and every sparse relation R, there is a
negligible function negl(·) such that:
Pr
k,
x←A(Hk)
[(
x,Hk(x)
) ∈ R] ≤ negl(λ).
We can also consider a quantitative generalization of correlation intractability.
Definition 13.3 (f -correlation intractability). A family of functions H = {Hk : D(λ) →
C(λ)}λ∈N is f -correlation intractable w.r.t. a function f : N × [0, 1] → [0, 1] if for all time
function T (·), for all density function µ(·), for every adversary A of running time T (λ),
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and every relation R with density µ(λ), it holds that
Pr
k,
x←A(Hk)
[(
x,Hk(x)
) ∈ R] ≤ f(T, µ).
For example, random oracles satisfy f -correlation intractability for f(T, µ) = T · µ.
Definition 13.2 can be viewed as f -correlation intractability w.r.t. f(T, µ) = T · µ, for all
polynomial T (·), and all negligible µ(·). In the rest of the paper, “correlation intractability”
refers to Definition 13.2 unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Survey of impossible parameters for correlation intractability. For some pa-
rameters relevant to the length of seed, key, input and output of the function, correlation
intractability w.r.t. binary sparse relations is impossible to achieve. We survey some of
the results.
[38] shows that a function family cannot be correlation intractable when the bit-length
of the key of the function is short compared to the bit-length of the input.
Claim 13.4 ([38]). Let κ and ` denote the bit-length of the key and the input. Hλ is not
correlation intractable w.r.t. efficiently checkable relations when κ(λ) ≤ `(λ).
Proof. Consider the diagonalization relation Rdiag = {(k, hk(k))|k ∈ K(λ)}. The attacker
outputs k.
The impossibility result generalizes to keys that are slightly larger than the bit-length of
the input, but still smaller than the sum of the bit-length of input plus output `(λ)+m(λ).
The idea is to consider an extension of the diagonalization relation s.t. the relation checks
a prefix of k — as long as the key is not too long, the relation is still sparse, albeit not
necessarily efficient checkable.
Claim 13.5 ([38]). Let κ, ` and m denote the bit-length of the key, the input, and the
output. Hλ is not correlation intractable w.r.t. possibly inefficiently checkable relations
when κ(λ) ≤ `(λ) +m(λ)− ω(log(λ)).
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We also observe when the “family size” of the function is relatively small, precisely,
when the seed length is small w.r.t. the output length, then the function family is not
correlation intractable w.r.t. possibly inefficiently checkable relations. This case is not
ruled out by Claim 13.5 when the key is potentially long but derived from a short seed
(e.g. from applying a PRG on a short seed).
Claim 13.6 ([37]). Hλ is not correlation intractable when the seed space S(λ) and the
range C(λ) satisfies |S(λ)| ≤ negl(λ) · |C(λ)|.
Proof. Fix the hash function family Hλ, consider the relation RH that collects every func-
tions in the function family RH = {(x, hk(x)) | s ∈ S, k = g(s), x ∈ D(λ)}. The density
of the relation less or equal to |S(λ)|/|C(λ)| ≤ negl(λ). The attacker simply outputs any
input.
For the discussions of the other impossibility results, we refer the readers to [38] for the
details.
13.1 The connection to Fiat-Shamir heuristics
We discuss the relation of correlation intractability to Fiat-Shamir heuristics [51] and the
existence of constant-round zero-knowledge proof-systems. For more discussions on the
relations to the other notions we refer the readers to [36].
Definition 13.7 (Interactive proof-systems [65]). An interactive proof-system for a lan-
guage L is a protocol between a prover P and a verifier V . The prover’s runtime is
unbounded. The verifier runs in probabilistic polynomial time. The protocol satisfies
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L, the verifier V accepts with probability 1 after
interacting with P on common input x.
• Soundness: For every x /∈ L and every cheating prover P ∗, the verifier accepts with
negligible probability after interacting with P ∗ on common input x.
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An interactive protocol is called an argument-system if it satisfies Definition 13.7 except
that the prover is restricted to run in (non-uniform) polynomial time. An interactive proof
or argument is called public-coin if the verifier’s messages are random coins.
Correlation intractability and public-coin interactive proofs. Consider a language
L and a 3-round public-coin interactive proof Π for L. Let α, β, γ be the 3 messages in
the protocol (α and γ are sent by the prover P , β is sent by the verifier V ). The relation
R/∈L,Π is defined by
R/∈L,Π =
{(
(x, α), β) : x /∈ L and ∃γ s.t. V (x, α, β, γ) = Accept} . (13.1)
Observe that the relation R/∈L,Π is sparse due to the statistical soundness of the under-
lying proof, i.e. the density of R/∈L,Π is equal to the soundness error of Π.
Correlation intractability can also capture a stronger notion of soundness called adap-
tive soundness. We say that a 3-message interactive proof-system as above has adaptive
soundness, if the message α sent by the honest prover does not depend on x, and soundness
is guaranteed even if the adversary may choose the input x 6∈ L on which to cheat after
seeing β. For such protocols we define the relation R/∈L,Π as
R/∈L,Π =
{(
α, β
)
: ∃x, γ s.t. x /∈ L ∧ V (x, α, β, γ) = Accept} (13.2)
Again, the relation R/∈L,Π is sparse due to the adaptive soundness of Π.
Correlation intractability also implies the soundness of Fiat-Shamir for general constant-
round public-coin interactive proof-systems. Without loss of generality assuming the num-
ber of rounds in the starting proof-system is 2c for a constant c. In the resulting 2-message
argument, the verifier samples c independent correlation intractable hash functions. For
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., c}, the prover applies the ith hash function on (α1||β1||...||αi−1||βi−1||αi) to
generate βi, where αi is the i
th message from the prover in the starting proof-system. The
message from the prover in the resulting 2-message argument is then (α1||β1||...||αc||βc).
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It is shown that the transformation above yields a sound 2-message argument if the
hash functions are entropy preserving [14]. Given that CI families that withstand arbitrary
binary relations are entropy preserving [36], we have
Lemma 13.8 ([72, 49, 14, 36]). Assuming there exists a correlation intractable function
family w.r.t. all binary sparse relations, then the Fiat-Shamir transformation is sound
when applied on any constant-round public-coin interactive proof-systems.
Chapter 14
Overview of the Constructions of Correlation
Intractable Functions
14.1 Starting from obfuscating pseudorandom functions
A natural approach to constructing functions with random-oracle-like properties is to ob-
fuscate pseudorandom functions. Indeed, if the obfuscation was perfect, then the adversary
would be unable to take advantage of the code any more than by merely having oracle access
to the function.
Strong security definitions of obfuscation are formalized in the work of Hada [71] and
Barak et al. [13], e.g. Virtual-black-box (VBB) Obfuscation. However, they also show that
VBB obfuscation is impossible for many function families. In particular, Barak et al. [13]
explicitly construct a PRF such that given any program (no matter how obfuscated) that
computes the PRF, the adversary can find an input which evaluates to a fixed value. This
certainly breaks correlation intractability. We also know that no pseudorandom function
family can be VBB obfuscated with respect to auxiliary inputs [63, 17]. However, these
results do not rule out the possibility that there exist pseudorandom functions whose
obfuscated version is correlation intractable.
A reasonable next step may thus be to consider PRFs with additional properties, such
as constrained PRFs [76, 26, 28]. Indeed, as demonstrated by multiple works, starting with
the ingenious work of Sahai and Waters [93], puncturable PRFs are an extremely powerful
tool when combined with obfuscation of general programs. In particular, puncturable PRFs
have been used together with iO to instantiate some random-oracle-like hash functions,
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including universal hardcore functions [16], universal computational extractors [34], and
functions used for the full-domain-hash construction [74]. Furthermore, the constructions
of [16] and [34] are simply obfuscating puncturable PRFs.
In [36], we show that puncturable pseudorandom functions, obfuscated using an in-
distinguishability obfuscator, satisfy bounded correlation intractability. Here “bounded”
means that there is a polynomial upper bound on the computational complexity of the
sparse relations considered, and the complexity of the function family depends on that
bound.
Bounded correlation intractability is indeed a qualitatively weaker property than full
correlation intractability. Still, even in its bounded form, correlation intractability is a very
strong notion that has not been constructed before.
14.2 Technical overview of the “iO of puncturable PRF” approach
Our goal is to prove correlation intractability of certain function family. At a high level,
our approach is to show, given a relation R, that a function f sampled randomly from the
initial function family is indistinguishable from another function, fR, that is constructed
specifically so as to make it hard to find “bad inputs” with respect to the given relation R.
However, the definition of this function fR, and moreover showing that it is indistin-
guishable from the original function f , needs to be done with care. In particular, the
“naive” methodology of simply puncturing f at all the bad points, so as to obtain a func-
tion where no bad points for relation R exist, fails. We start by briefly explaining this
failure.
Failure of the “standard” puncturing methodology. Recall that a PRF is punc-
turable if for any key K and input value x it is possible to generate a key K{x} that
is “punctured” at x, such that FK(x) remains pseudorandom even given K{x}, and yet
K{x} allows evaluating FK at all points other than x. To prove security of constructions
that use puncturable PRFs obfuscated with iO, the “standard” methodology proceeds in
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two steps to get an indistinguishable game that an adversary cannot win (thus showing,
by indistinguishability, that the adversary also fails in the original game). In the first
step (whose indistinguishability is proven via iO), one typically punctures the key at the
bad inputs that threaten the security of the scheme, and hardwires the output values for
the punctured inputs. In the second step (whose indistinguishability is proven via the
puncturable PRF), the output values at the punctured inputs are changed to ensure the
adversary can’t exploit them.
In our scenario, given a relation R, the “bad” inputs are those x values that satisfy
R(x, FK(x)) = 1, where K is randomly sampled after R is fixed. However, it is not clear
how puncturing at these bad points helps here, since it is not clear how to argue that
changing the output values so as to avoid R is indistinguishable. (In fact, it can be seen
from our analysis that such change may well be distinguishable overall.)
Said otherwise, the “standard” puncturing technique is geared toward the case where
the bad input values are fixed before the PRF key K is chosen, whereas for correlation
intractability, the bad points are determined by K.
A “counterintuitive” puncturing strategy. To get around this difficulty, we start
from the following observation: for any sparse relation, the “bad” inputs x (i.e., those for
which R(x, FK(x)) = 1) are rare—in fact, they can be recognized by a circuit from an
evasive circuit family. All we need to do in order to prove correlation intractability is show
an indistinguishable function in which those rare inputs are hidden from the adversary.
We do so by decomposing the PRF into two branches: one defined on the bad inputs,
which form an evasive set, the other defined on the “innocent” inputs. Then we apply an
input-hiding obfuscator to the bad branch. However, the input-hiding obfuscator cannot
work in the presence of auxiliary information given by the innocent branch: the value of
the function on the innocent inputs may permit the adversary to find the evasive inputs.
We therefore puncture the key and change the function at every input that belongs to the
innocent branch. To avoid increasing the circuit size beyond polynomial as we puncture at
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exponentially many points, we build an alternative function family FR that is designed to
avoid R. The details of the key-switching strategy form the technical heart of the proof.
The proof in a nutshell. To better illustrate the main idea, we present an overview of
the proof. The analysis goes through 3 hybrids, as will be presented by the games between
the adversary and the challenger. Hybrid 0 represents the original game. Hybrid 1, 2, and
3 are intermediate games that are indistinguishable by the adversary. Finally we will show
that the adversary cannot break correlation intractability in hybrid 3, therefore concluding
that the adversary also fails in hybrid 0, since hybrids 0 and 3 are indistinguishable.
We note that the circuits being iOed shall be padded to the same size, which is possible
in our construction if an a priori bound on the size of the relation is given. Under this lim-
itation, our techniques suffice to prove only a bounded version of correlation intractability.
For the simplicity of the overview, we postpone the details of padding to the formal proof
and now present the hybrids.
For any sparse relation R that is recognizable by some bounded polynomial sized circuit:
0. The challenger samples a key K of puncturable PRF F and obfuscates it:
h0k(·) = iO(FK(·))
The adversary wins if it outputs x such that (x, h0k(x)) ∈ R. This is the original
game. The only thing that changes in subsequent games is the circuit obfuscated iO.
1. The challenger samples a key K of puncturable PRF F , and embeds the relation R
into the description of the function:
h1k(x) = iO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x) ; the “bad” branch
else, return FK(x) ; the “innocent” branch

Note that h1 has the same functionality as h0, and therefore it is indistinguish-
able from the original function by iO. (Recall that an iO scheme iO guarantees that
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iO(C) ≈ iO(C ′) for any two circuits C,C ′ that have the same size and functionality.)
This is a preparation step, which enables us to partition the function as described
above.
2. Replace the key that is evaluated on the innocent branch with a freshly generated
key K ′ for a different puncturable PRF FR parameterized by R:
h2k(x) = iO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x) ; the “bad” branch
else, return FRK′(x) ; the “innocent” branch

where FR is designed such that there is no x such that (x, FRK′(x)) ∈ R with high
probability. To generate a key K ′ for FR, we sample a set of independent puncturable
PRF keys K1, ..., KT (n) from F . The function FRK′ executes in a “rejection sampling”
fashion, such that for input x, it goes through the keys K1, ..., KT (n) one by one,
evaluates on the first key Ki for which (x, FKi(x)) is not in the relation. Setting T
to be linear in ` is enough to make sure that x not in the relation is found except
with exponentially small probability.
To prove the indistinguishability of h1 and h2, we show that both of them are subexpo-
nentially secure puncturable PRFs, based on the subexponential security assumption
on the underlying puncturable PRF F . We then use Lemma 5.10 to show that h1
and h2 are indistinguishable after being obfuscated by subexponentially secure iO.
3. Wrap the first “if-trigger”, together with the underlying evasive function, by input-
hiding obfuscation. The function h3k is then generated as:
h3k(x) = iO

y ← IHO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)
else, return ⊥
 ; the “bad” branch
if y = ⊥, y ← FRK′(x) ; the “innocent” branch
return y

h3 is indistinguishable from h2 because they are functionally equivalent and obfuscated by
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iO.
Finally, we note that finding the x values that trigger the non-zero values on the “input-
hiding-box” is hard, given R and an “innocent” function FRK′ generated independently (even
if not obfuscated). Since the adversary cannot distinguish whether she is given the original
function h0 or the function h3, and finding an input on h3 that satisfies the relation is
hard, it should also be infeasible for the adversary to break correlation intractability on
the original function.
The current status of obfuscation. We conclude the overview with a brief summary
of the current status of general purpose iO and evasive circuit obfuscation candidates, even
though the current status is not that important unless these two notions were shown to
be impossible to achieve. The short conclusion is: we do not know how to show they are
impossible to obtain, neither do we know how to base them on established cryptographic
assumptions.
There are iO candidates that are not broken, e.g. [54] instantiated with any one of
the graded encoding candidates [52, 46, 56]. Most of the general-purpose obfuscation
candidates (e.g. [53], instantiated with any one of [52, 46, 56]) are not broken if the circuit
to be obfuscated is from an evasive family and no dependent auxiliary inputs are given.
However, the existing attacks (e.g. [44, 41, 42]) do apply when given dependent auxiliary
inputs.
14.3 Correlation intractability without obfuscation
After [36], Kalai et al. [75] showed that iO of puncturable PRF satisfies correlation in-
tractability for arbitrary binary relations, which suffices for the soundness of Fiat-Shamir
transformation when applied to interactive proof-systems. The next goal was then to re-
place the use of iO and puncturable PRF with simpler constructions. For example, maybe
the private constrained PRF from [35] can be proven correlation intractable, using the
methodology of [36] or [75]. Surprisingly we get an even simpler construction, so let me
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present the simple construction first, then mention its connection to the previous iO-based
constructions.
Let (Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme with key space K, message space M and
ciphertext space C. The hash function family H = {hc : K → M}c∈C is defined by
hc(k) = Deck(c). That is, a function hc in the family is defined via a ciphertext c ∈ C.
Given an input k, the function hc decrypts c using key k and returns the decrypted plain-
text.
A high level rationale for the construction may be the following: Consider a ciphertext
c = Enc(k,m) where both k and m are random. If the encryption scheme is good, then it
should be guaranteed that, when trying to decrypt c with any key k′ 6= k, then the result
should be completely “random looking”. Intuitively, this means that finding a key k′ such
that Dec(k′, c) = m′ for some target m′ should be hard. The universal ciphertexts property
guarantees that a random ciphertext looks like the result of encrypting a random message
with a random key. KDM security guarantees that the above intuition applies even when
considering relations that look at both the key and the corresponding message together (as
is indeed the case for correlation intractability.)
Indeed, the crux of the proof is in translating correlation intractability, which is a
requirement on the (in)ability of polynomial time adversaries to find structure in a public
function, to a secrecy requirement on the corresponding encryption process.
The actual proof is strongly inspired by that of [75]. In fact, we follow essentially the
same sequence of logical steps. However, the argumentation used to move from one step
to the next is different in some key places. Specifically, our goal is to turn an adversary
A that breaks correlation intractability of the hash function into an adversary that breaks
KDM security of the underlying encryption scheme. Following [75], we start by considering
a conditional experiment where we fix some random value k∗, and consider only the proba-
bility that A, given the hash key c, outputs a key k such that the correlation R(k,Dec(k, c))
holds, and in addition k = k∗. While this probability is very small, it allows us to move
(with some loss) to a different experiment where the value c that A sees is the result of
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encrypting f(k∗) with key k∗, where f is a function related to R. We now observe that
recovering the right k∗ corresponds to breaking the KDM security of the scheme.
As in [75], the price of this analytical approach is an exponential loss in security against
guessing attacks. On the other hand, in the case of the [75] scheme and analysis, the crit-
ical switch from one conditional experiment to another relies on sub-exponentially secure
indistinguishability obfuscation. Here, in contrast, the move is purely statistical.
14.4 A warm-up construction from discrete logarithm
As a warm-up to the general scheme, we present a simple construction based on the discrete-
log problem. Along the way we will give the rationale of the proof strategy adapted from
the work of Kalai, Rothblum and Rothblum [75], and explain the level of KDM security
we need for the underlying discrete-log problem.
Let G be a cyclic group where the discrete-log problem is hard. Assume the size of G
is roughly 2λ where λ is the security parameter. Let g be a generator of G, A = ga, B = gb
be two random elements in G. Consider the following length preserving function H :
{1, ..., |G|} → G
HA,B(x) := A
x ·B = gax+b ∈ G. (14.1)
Theorem 14.1. Given G(λ) of sizes N(λ) ≈ 2λ, with a generator g and efficient group
operations, such that for any super-polynomial function s, any (not necessarily efficiently
computable) function f : [N ]→ [N ], and any polynomial time adversary A:
Pr
k,a←[N ]
[
A
(
ga, gak+f(k)
)
= k
]
≤ s(λ)
2λ
.
Then HA,B is correlation intractable w.r.t. all sparse relations.
Towards a contradiction, let R be any sparse relation with negligible density µ(λ).
Suppose there exists an efficient adversary Adv that breaks correlation intractability w.r.t.
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R with non-negligible probability ν:
Pr
A,B
[(
Adv(HA,B)→ x
)
∧
((
x,HA,B(x)
) ∈ R)] ≥ ν, (14.2)
where the notation Adv(HA,B)→ x simply means that we use x to refer to the string that
Adv(HA,B) outputs.
In the first step, we translate the probability of outputting some x to the probability
of outputting a particular x∗. For a random x∗ from the domain, the probability that the
adversary outputs x∗ as the answer is greater or equal to ν divided by the domain size
Pr
x∗ $←{0,1}λ
A,B
[(
Adv(HA,B)→ x′
)
∧
(
x′ = x∗
)
∧
((
x∗, HA,B(x∗)
) ∈ R)] ≥ ν/2λ. (14.3)
Focusing on a single x∗ costs a huge loss in the success probability. The readers may
wonder what is the motivation of doing so. The purpose of fixing an input x∗ is to prepare
for replacing the winning condition
(
x∗, HA,B(x∗)
) ∈ R by another condition that is “key
independent”. Towards this goal, consider the following sampling procedure: first sample
a random y∗ from the range, then sample the key (A′, B′) randomly under the condition
HA′,B′(x
∗) = y∗. Now we use the fact that H is a “one-universal” function, which means
that for a fixed input, a uniformly random key projects the input to a uniformly random
output. In turn, a uniformly random output corresponds to a uniformly random key.
Therefore the key (A′, B′) obtained from reverse sampling distributes the same as before.
Hence we have
Pr
x∗ $←{0,1}λ
y∗ $←G,
A′,B′ s.t. HA′,B′ (x∗)=y∗
[(
Adv(HA′,B′) = x
′
)
∧
(
x′ = x∗
)
∧
((
x∗, HA′,B′(x∗)
) ∈ R)] ≥ ν/2λ.
(14.4)
Given that y∗ = HA′,B′(x∗), we can change the winning condition in Eqn. (14.4) into one
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which is independent from the function HA′,B′ :
Pr
x∗ $←{0,1}λ
y∗ $←G
A′,B′ s.t. HA′,B′ (x∗)=y∗
[(
Adv(HA′,B′) = x
′) ∧ (x′ = x∗) ∧ ((x∗, y∗) ∈ R)] ≥ ν/2λ. (14.5)
Separating the winning condition (x∗, y∗) ∈ R from the hash key paves the way for
connecting correlation intractability to a property that is only about hiding one specific
point in the key (instead of hiding a bunch of potential input-output pairs in the relation).
In the next statement, the first equality follows by the definition of conditional probability.
The inequality follows from Eqn. (14.5) together with the fact that R is µ sparse:
Pr
x∗,y∗ s.t. (x∗,y∗)∈R,
A′,B′ s.t. HA′,B′ (x
∗)=y∗
[(
Adv(HA′,B′)→ x′
) ∧ (x′ = x∗)] =
Pr
x∗ $←{0,1}λ
y∗ $←G
A′,B′ s.t. HA′,B′ (x
∗)=y∗

Adv(HA′,B′) = x
′
x′ = x∗
(x∗, y∗) ∈ R

Pr
x∗ $←{0,1}λ
y∗ $←G
[
(x∗, y∗) ∈ R]
≥ ν
2λ · µ(λ)
(14.6)
The LHS of Eqn. (14.6) spells out as an efficient adversary’s success probability of find-
ing the input x∗ embedded in A′, B′, where the key A′, B′ is sampled conditioned on
mapping some input-output pair in the relation (x∗, y∗) ∈ R. Let’s examine A′, B′, and
for simplicity consider only the constant relations Rc =
{
(x, c) | ∀x ∈ {0, 1}λ}. Fix a
c∗ ∈ G, a random input-output pair from Rc∗ distributes as (x∗, c∗), where x∗ is uni-
formly random from {0, 1}λ. For A′ = ga′ , B = gb′ sampled randomly from the set{
ga
′
, gb
′ | gz∗ := c∗ = ga′x∗+b′
}
, where z∗ is explicitly defined as the discrete-log of c∗ over
base g for the convenience of explanation. Observe that the marginal distribution of a′ is
uniform, and b′ equals to z∗− a′x∗. In other words, the adversary is asked to find x∗ given
A′ = ga′ , B′ = gz∗−a′x∗ where z∗ is fixed. The hardness of this problem follows directly
from the hardness of the discrete-log problem.
What is the hardness required for the underlying discrete-log problem in order to form
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a contradiction? For the probability in the hypothesis ν(λ)
2λ·µ(λ) , where ν is a non-negligible
function; µ, the density of a sparse relation, is an arbitrary negligible function. We can
form a contradiction by assuming that every polynomial time algorithm for the discrete-
log problem over G succeeds with probability less than s(λ)/2λ for any super-polynomial
function s.
What happens when we consider all sparse relations instead of only the constant re-
lations? For a general sparse relation, sampling a random pair (x∗, y∗) from the relation
may result into an output y∗ that is correlated to the input x∗. Take the “fixed point”
relation Rx=y := {(x, y) | x = y} as an example. A random input-output pair from Rx=y
distributes as (x∗, x∗), where x∗ is uniformly random. For A′ = ga′ , B = gb′ sampled
randomly from the set
{
ga
′
, gb
′ | gz∗(x∗) := x∗ = ga′x∗+b′
}
, where z∗(x∗) is the discrete-log
of x∗ over base g (unlike in the previous example, now z∗ depends on the input x∗). The
marginal distribution of a′ is still uniform, and b′ equals to z∗(x∗)− a′x∗. In other words,
the adversary is asked to find x∗ given A′ = ga′ , B′ = gz∗(x∗)−a′x∗ where z∗(·) is a function
on x∗, a′ is independent from x∗ and uniform. The latter corresponds to the hardness
of finding the decryption key x∗ given a ciphertext of ElGamal encryption with uniform
randomness a′, and key-dependent message z∗(x∗).
To summarize, the proof strategy translates the hardness of finding any solution in
a sparse relation to the hardness of finding the key from the encryption of possibly key-
dependent messages. The translation is purely statistical, but it results into a significant
cost in the final computational assumption — the success probability for any polytime at-
tacker has to be extremely small. To capture arbitrary relations, arbitrary key dependency
functions are considered.
Chapter 15
On the Correlation Intractability of Obfuscated
PRFs
In this chapter we give the construction of correlation intractable function ensembles with
respect to all the sparse relations recognizable by circuits of size up to a given polynomial
p(·).
Construction 15.1 ( Bounded CI ). Let F = {FK : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N be a
puncturable pseudorandom function. Let the function ensemble H = {hk : {0, 1}`(λ) →
{0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N be constructed as
hk(·) = iO(FK(·), padding(λ))
where K
$← Fλ, for some length of padding.
Theorem 15.2 ( Bounded CI ). Let p(λ) be a polynomial in the security parameter n. As-
suming the existence of input-hiding obfuscation for all evasive circuits, sub-exponentially
secure indistinguishability obfuscation for P/poly, and sub-exponentially secure puncturable
PRF, there is an appropriate polynomial size of padding such that the family H is p(λ)-
bounded correlation intractable.
The size of padding (which represents arbitrary gates that do not change the function-
ality of the circuit) will be discussed at the end of the proof (see remark 15.6). In short,
it depends on p and the blow-up due to input-hiding obfuscation. In the proof below, we
drop the explicit mention of padding from the construction in order to simplify notation.
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Proof of Theorem 15.2: The proof in this section follows the outline presented in
Section 14.2. The proof goes through 3 hybrids. From the original game which captures
the security definition of correlation intractability, we move to intermediate games 1, 2,
and 3 that are indistinguishable by the adversary. Finally we will show that the adversary
cannot win in game 3 except for negligible probability. We conclude that the adversary
also fails in game 0, since the adversary cannot distinguish game 0 and game 3.
More specifically, fix an adversary and a δ(λ)-sparse relation R. Then:
Game 0: The original game. The adversary receives the key of the function h0k con-
structed by the challenger:
h0k(·) = iO(FK(·)) (0)
The adversary wins if he outputs an x such that R(x, h0k(x)) = 1. The winning condition
is the same in each subsequent game; what changes is that h0 is replaced by h1, h2,
and h3, which are computed as obfuscations of different circuits, each described in the
corresponding game below.
Game 1: Embed the relation into the description without changing the func-
tionality. The challenger samples a puncturable key K, then generates h1k which has the
relation R embedded:
h1k(x) = iO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)
else, return FK(x)
 (1)
The hybrids h0k and h
1
k have identical functionality. Therefore, because both h
0
k and h
1
k are
obfuscated by iO, they are indistinguishable for any p.p.t. adversary.
Game 2: Switch to a function where the “innocent” branch is generated inde-
pendently from the “bad” branch and avoids R. The challenger constructs a new
function family FR that always avoids R, as described below, and generates h2k as:
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h2k(x) = iO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)
else, return FRK′(x)
 (2)
where FK
$← Fλ and FRK′
$← FR. The function family FR is constructed as follows:
Construction 15.3 (FR). Let FR = {FRK′ : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}λ be a function family,
where each FRK′ is constructed as follows:
FRK′(x) =

K ′ = (K1,K2, . . . ,KT (λ))
for i = 1 to T (λ) :
if R(x, FKi(x)) = 0, return FKi(x)
return ⊥

(2.else)
where T (λ) = `(λ)log(λ) . The functions FK1 , ..., FKT (λ) are sampled independently from any
puncturable PRF family F .
The functionality of FRK′ is to output, given an input x, the pseudorandom value FKi(x),
where Ki is the first key among K1, ...,KT (λ) s.t. R(x, FKi(x)) = 0 (if no such Ki exists,
output ⊥). The iteration bound T (λ) is set large enough to make sure that FRK′ outputs
⊥ with probability less than 2−`(λ) · negl(λ) (we prove and use this fact in Lemma 15.4).
To prove that h2k is indistinguishable from h
1
k, let g
2
k be the same as h
2
k but without the
iO:
g2k(x) =
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)else, return FRK′(x) (2.inner)
First, using subexponential security of FK , we show in Lemma 15.4 that the g
2
k is also
a subexponentially secure puncturable PRF. Then due to Lemma 5.10, hk2 = iO(g
2
k) is
indistinguishable from hk0 = iO(FK), and therefore also indistinguishable from h
k
1.
Lemma 15.4 and Lemma 5.10 are both based on the sub-exponential hardness of punc-
turability and iO, respectively. Let Puncture be the adversary’s advantage of winning the
puncturability game of F and iO be the advantage of distinguishing the iO of two identical
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functions. We need to set
Puncture = iO = 2
−`(λ) · negl(λ)
This level of security can always be achieved from subexponential hardness by setting
the security parameter λ for the puncturable PRF and for iO sufficiently high, but still
polynomial in n: if the security of these two objects is 2−λ for security parameter λ, then
setting λ = (2`(λ))1/ is sufficient.
Lemma 15.4. Assume that F is a subexponentially secure puncturable PRF with the
advantage of distinguishing being Puncture = 2
−`(λ) ·negl(λ). Then the function g2k (i.e., the
function being obfuscated in h2k) is also a subexponentially secure puncturable PRF with
the advantage of distinguishing at most 2−`(λ) · negl(λ).
Proof. To puncture g2k on input x
∗, we puncture all the inner PRF keys K, K1, ..., KT (λ)
on x∗, and construct the punctured function as follows:
k{x∗} = (R,K{x∗},K ′{x∗} = (K1{x∗}, . . . ,KT (λ){x∗}))
gk{x∗}(x) =
 if R(x, FK{x∗}(x)) = 1, return FK{x∗}(x)
else, return FRK′{x∗}(x)
 (2.p)
where FRK′{x∗} is constructed as:
FRK′{x∗}(x) =

K ′{x∗} = (K1{x∗}, . . . ,KT (λ){x∗})
for i = 1 to T (λ) :
if R(x, FKi{x∗}(x)) = 0, return FKi{x∗}(x)
return ⊥

(2.else.p)
By the puncturability of F , the outputs of FK{x∗} and FKi{x∗} on the punctured points
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are indistinguishable from random even given k{x∗}. More precisely,
(
k{x∗}, FK(x∗), FK1(x∗), ..., FKT (λ)(x∗)
)
≈ (k{x∗}, U0, U1, . . . , UT (λ))
(where (U0, U1, ..., UT (λ))
$← {0, 1}(T (λ)+1)·m(λ)). The advantage of any p.p.t. adversary to
distinguish these two tuples is
(T (λ) + 1) · Puncture = (T (λ) + 1) · 2−`(λ) · negl(λ) = 2−`(λ) · negl(λ)
Construct the distribution Vx∗ by sampling random U0, . . . , UT (λ) and computing
Vx∗ =

if R(x∗, U0) = 1, return U0
else : for i = 1 to T (λ) :
if R(x∗, Ui) = 0, return Ui
return ⊥

From the indistinguishability of FK(x
∗) and FKi(x∗) from uniform, it follows that Vx∗ is
indistinguishable from g2k(x
∗):
(
k{x∗}, g2k(x∗)
) ≈ (k{x∗}, Vx∗)
and the advantage of any p.p.t. adversary to distinguish these two pairs is 2−`(λ) · negl(λ).
To complete the proof, we will show that Vx∗ is very close to uniform over {0, 1}m(λ): it
differs from uniform by the probability that Vx∗ = ⊥. Indeed,
• For all y ∈ {0, 1}m(λ) such that R(x∗, y) = 1,
Pr[Vx∗ = y] = Pr[U0 = y] = 2
−m(λ)
• Pr[Vx∗ = ⊥] = (1− δx∗(λ))δx∗(λ)T (λ)
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• For all y ∈ {0, 1}m(λ) such that R(x∗, y) = 0 (note that there are 2m(λ)(1 − δx∗(λ))
such values)
Pr[Vx∗ = y]
= Pr[Vx∗ = y|R(x∗, Vx∗) 6= 1 ∧ Vx∗ 6= ⊥] Pr[R(x∗, Vx∗) 6= 1 ∧ Vx∗ 6= ⊥]
=
1
2m(λ)(1− δx∗(λ))
(1− Pr[Vx∗ 6= ⊥ ∧R(x∗, Vx∗) = 1]− Pr[Vx∗ = ⊥])
=
1
2m(λ)(1− δx∗(λ))
(1− δx∗(λ)− (1− δx∗(λ))δx∗(λ)T (λ))
= 2−m(λ) ·
(
1− (1− δx∗(λ))δx∗(λ)
T (λ)
1− δx∗(λ)
)
= 2−m(λ) ·
(
1− δx∗(λ)T (λ)
)
Thus, the statistical difference between Vx∗ and the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m(λ)
(which is a bound on any distinguisher’s advantage) is
1
2
∑
y∈{⊥}∪{0,1}n
|Pr[Vx∗ = y]− Pr[U = y]| (U is uniform over {0, 1}m(λ))
=
1
2
(1− δx∗(λ))δx∗(λ)T (λ) + ∑
y s.t. R(x∗,y)=0
(
2−m(λ) − 2−m(λ) ·
(
1− δx∗(λ)T (λ)
))
= (1− δx∗(λ))δx∗(λ)T (λ) ≤ δx∗(λ)T (λ)
We thus obtain that Vx∗ can be distinguished from uniform with advantage at most
δx∗(λ)
T (λ) = 2−`(λ) · negl(λ), because T (λ) = `(λ)log(λ) and δx(λ) is a negligible function.
Vx∗ is independent of k{x∗}. Therefore, the advantage of any adversary in distinguishing
(k{x∗}, Vx∗) from (k{x∗}, U) is 2−`(λ) · negl(λ). And we already know the same is true for
distinguishing (k{x∗}, g2k(x∗)) from (k{x∗}, Vx∗). Thus, even given k{x∗}, g2k cannot be
distinguished from uniform with advantage better than 2−`(λ) · negl(λ), which concludes
the proof.
Combining Lemma 15.4 and Lemma 5.10, h1k is indistinguishable from h
2
k.
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Game 3: Wrap the “bad” branch by input-hiding obfuscation, without changing
the functionality. The challenger generates h3k that is functionally equivalent to h
2
k but
is computed differently. The difference is that in game 3, the challenger first wraps the if
statement together with the true branch with input-hiding obfuscation (the challenger also
applies iO to the entire function, just like in the previous games, which ensures that h2k is
indistinguishable from h3k):
h3k(x) = iO

y ← IHO
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)
else, return ⊥

if y = ⊥ , y ← FRK′(x)
return y

(3)
Let ERK(x) denote
 if R(x, FK(x)) = 1, return FK(x)
else, return ⊥
.
Proposition 15.5. ER = {ERK : {0, 1}`(λ) → {0, 1}m(λ)}λ∈N is an evasive circuit family.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that there is an input x′ ∈ {0, 1}`(λ) on which there are
non-negligibly many keys that evaluate to a value other than ⊥. We can then build a
(non-uniform) adversary that distinguishes the PRF FK(x) from a truly random function
with non-neglible advantage. The adversary simply queries input x′ to the function and
checks if the output y satisfies R(x′, y).
Note that h2k and h
3
k are functionally equivalent. Therefore, by indistinguishability
obfuscation, the adversary cannot distinguish game 2 and game 3.
Finally, in Game 3: Suppose that there is a p.p.t. adversary A who gets h3k, finds an
input x such that R(x, h3k(x)) = 1 with non-negligible probability η(λ), we build an adver-
sary A′ that breaks IHO for evasive circuit family ER: A′ gets IHO(ERK(·)), samples FRK′
independently, and creates h3k as described in construction (3), sends it to A. For adver-
sary A, finding an input x to h3 such that R(x, h3k(x)) = 1 is equivalent to finding such an
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input to IHO(ERK(·)) that evaluates to an non-bottom value, because FRK′ is independently
generated and always avoids R (FRK′ outputs ⊥ rather than hit R).
The advantage of adversary A′ is thus the following:
Pr
K
[A′(IHO(ER,K(·)))→ x : ER,K(x) 6= ⊥]
= Pr
K,K′
[A(IHO(ER,K(·)), R, FRK′)→ x : ER,K(x) 6= ⊥]
≥Pr
k
[A(h3k(·))→ x : R(x, h3k(x)) = 1] ≥ η(λ)
which forms the contradiction.
If a p.p.t. adversary could find x such R(x, h0k(x)) = 1, then she could distinguish h
0
from h3 (because testing R is polynomial-time). Thus, we complete the proof that H is
correlation intractable.
Remark 15.6 (The size of padding). Let κF (λ) be the key size of Fλ, κ∗F (λ) be the
punctured key size of Fλ, B(·) be the maximum blow-up of the input-hiding obfuscation.
The size of FRK′ is T (λ) · (p(λ) + 2 · κF (λ)). The maximum size of IHO(ER,K) is B(p(λ) +
2 · κF (λ)). The size of padding is bounded by
|padding(λ)| ≤ B(p(λ) + 2 ·κF (λ)) +T (λ) · (p(λ) + 2 ·κF (λ)) + (T (λ) + 2) ·κ∗F (λ) = poly(λ).
As the analysis suggests, the key size of the function inherently exceeds the maximum
size of R.
Chapter 16
Correlation Intractability from Strong-KDM
Encryption Schemes
16.1 Strong KDM-secure encryption schemes
Let M = {Mλ}λ∈N be an ensemble of message spaces (i.e., Mλ is the message space
with respect to security parameter λ ∈ N). An encryption scheme, with respect to the
message space M, consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm PP-Gen, Enc
and Dec. The public-parameter generation algorithm PP-Gen gets as input 1λ and outputs
some public-parameters pp (without loss of generality we assume that pp contains λ).
Given the public-parameters pp, a key k ∈ {0, 1}λ and a message m ∈ Mλ the encryption
algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm Dec gets as input the
public-parameters pp, a key k as well as a ciphertext c and outputs a message in Mλ. We
require that (with probability 1), for every setting of the public-parameters pp, message
m ∈Mλ and key k ∈ {0, 1}λ it holds that Dec(pp, k,Enc(pp, k,m)) = m.
In many encryption schemes each ciphertext is associated with some particular key.
We will be interested in schemes where this is not the case. Namely, ciphertexts are not
associated with a specific key, but rather “make sense” under any possible key. We denote
by Cpp the distribution obtained by encrypting a random message using a random key.
Namely, the distribution Enc(pp, k,m) where k ∈R {0, 1}λ and m ∈RMλ.
Definition 16.1 (Universal Ciphertexts). We say an encryption scheme (PP-Gen,Enc,Dec)
with respect to message space M = {Mλ}λ∈N has universal ciphertexts if the following
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two conditions hold for all constant η > 0, for all (sufficiently large) λ ∈ N and public
parameters pp ∈ PP-Gen(1λ):
1. For every fixed key k∗ ∈ {0, 1}λ, a random ciphertext decrypts to a random message.
Namely, the distribution m← Dec(pp, k∗, c), where c← Cpp, is 2−(1+η)λ-statistically
close to uniform.
2. For all k∗ ∈ {0, 1}λ andm∗ ∈Mλ, the following distributions are 2−(1+η)λ-statistically
close
• c← Cpp conditioned on Dec(pp, k∗, c) = m∗.
• c is sampled from c ← Enc(pp, k∗,m∗) (i.e., a fresh encryption of m∗ under
public parameters pp and key k∗).
Definition 16.2 (-KDM Security). Let  = (λ) ∈ [0, 1]. We say that an encryption
scheme (PP-Gen,Enc,Dec) is -KDM secure, if for every polynomial-time adversary A, for
all sufficiently large values of λ and any (possibly inefficient) function f : {0, 1}λ →Mλ it
holds that:
Pr
pp←PP-Gen(1λ)
k∈R{0,1}λ
[
A(pp,Enc(pp, k, f(k)) = k] < .
16.2 Main theorem
Let PP-Gen, Enc, Dec be an encryption scheme with respect to an ensemble of message
spacesM = {Mλ}λ∈N, as defined in Chapter 16.1. For public parameters pp recall that we
denote by Cpp the distribution obtained by encrypting a random message using a random
key (with respect to public parameters pp).
Construction 16.3. We construct a hash function family H = {Hλ : {0, 1}λ →Mλ}λ∈N
as follows.
The key generation algorithm of the hash function takes input 1λ, samples public pa-
rameters pp of the encryption scheme and a random ciphertext c ← Cpp. The hash key is
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hk = (pp, c). On input the key (pp, c) and a message to be hashed α ∈ {0, 1}λ, the hashing
algorithm views α as a key of the encryption scheme and outputs Dec(pp, α, c).
The main result that we prove in this section is if the encryption scheme has universal
ciphertexts (as per Definition 16.1) and is ε-KDM secure (as per Definition 16.2), for
sufficiently small ε = ε(λ) > 0, then Construction 16.3 forms a correlation intractable hash
function family.
Theorem 16.4. If there exists an encryption scheme with universal ciphertexts that is
ε-KDM secure for ε ≤ (poly(λ) · 2λ · µ(λ))−1, then Construction 16.3 is correlation in-
tractable for all sparse relations with negligible density µ(λ).
Proof of Theorem 16.4. Let R be any sparse relation with negligible density µ = µ(λ).
Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
Adv that breaks the correlation intractability of Construction 16.3 with non-negligible
probability ν = ν(λ). Namely,
Pr
hk
[
Adv(Hhk) outputs some α ∧
(
α,Hhk(α)
) ∈ R] ≥ ν(λ).
Thus, by construction of our hash function it holds that:
Pr
pp
c←Cpp
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs some α s.t.
(
α,Dec(pp, α, c)
) ∈ R] ≥ ν(λ), (16.1)
where here and below we use pp to denote public parameters sampled from PP-Gen(1λ).
For the analysis, we consider a relaxed relation R′ where (α, β) ∈ R′ if (α, β) ∈ R or if
the first blog(ν/2µ)e bits of β are all 0. The density of R′ is bounded by µ′ ≤ 4µ/ν, which
is negligible when µ is negligible. Looking ahead, the purpose of “padding” R is so that the
marginal distribution of α∗, obtained from jointly sampling a pair (α∗, β∗) randomly from
R′, is close to uniform. More specifically, following [75, Proposition 3.4] we can bound the
point-wise multiplicative difference (or ratio) between these distributions:
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Proposition 16.5. For all α′ ∈ {0, 1}λ, β′ ∈Mλ,
Pr
α∗
β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
[
α∗ = α′, β∗ = β′
] ≥ 1
4
· Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
[
α∗ = α′, β∗ = β′
]
(16.2)
Since R ⊆ R′, Eq. (16.1) implies that:
Pr
pp←PP-Gen(1λ),
c←Cpp
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α s.t.
(
α,Dec(pp, α, c)
) ∈ R′] ≥ ν(λ). (16.3)
We will use Eq. (16.3) to show that Adv breaks the KDM security of our encryption
scheme, with respect to the randomized KDM function f that given a key α∗, outputs a
random β∗ such that (α∗, β∗) ∈ R′.
We now fix some setting of the public parameters pp. Using the structure of R′, and
the proposition that our encryption scheme has universal ciphertexts (Property 2 of Defi-
nition 16.1), it holds that:
Pr
α∗
β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Enc(pp,α∗,β∗)
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
(16.4)
≥ (1/4) · Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Enc(pp,α∗,β∗)
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
≥ (1/4) ·
 Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Cpp s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
− 2−(1+η)λ

where the first inequality is due to Proposition 16.5; the second is due to the universal
ciphertexts property.
Our key step is captured by the following proposition, which relates the adversary’s ad-
vantage of recovering the specific key α∗ in a ciphertext encrypting possibly key-dependent
messages, to the advantage of outputting any α that breaks correlation intractability.
While the winning probability in the key-recovery game is exponentially small, it is lower
bounded by a function of the success probability of breaking correlation intractability.
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Proposition 16.6. For every setting of the public-parameters pp it holds that:
Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
≥ 2
−λ
µ′
·
Pr
c
Adv(pp, c) outputs α s.t.(
α,Dec(pp, α, c)
) ∈ R′
− 2−ηλ
 ,
Proof. Fix the public parameters pp. By the proposition that the random variables (α∗, β∗)
and c are independent, it holds that:
Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
= Pr
α∗,β∗
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
∣∣ (α∗, β∗) ∈ R′].
(16.5)
By definition of conditional probability, it holds that:
Pr
α∗,β∗
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
∣∣ (α∗, β∗) ∈ R′]
=
Pr
α∗,β∗
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
(α∗, β∗) ∈ R′

Pr
α∗,β∗
[
(α∗, β∗) ∈ R′
]
≥ (1/µ′) · Pr
α∗,β∗
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
 Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗(
α∗,Dec(pp, α∗, c)
) ∈ R′
 , (16.6)
where the inequality follows from the density of R′.
Claim 16.7. The following two distributions are 2−(1+η)λ-close:
1. (α∗, c) s.t. α∗ ∈R {0, 1}λ, β∗ ∈RMλ and c← Cpp conditioned on Dec(pp, α∗, c) = β∗.
2. (α∗, c′) s.t. α∗ ∈R {0, 1}λ and c′ ← Cpp.
Proof. A different way to sample the exact same distribution as in item (2) is to first
sample α∗ ∈R {0, 1}λ, then c′′ ← Cpp and finally c′ ← Cpp conditioned on Dec(pp, α∗, c′) =
Dec(pp, α∗, c′′).
By the universal ciphertext property 16.1.1 of the encryption scheme, the distribution
Dec(pp, α∗, c′′) is 2−(1+η)λ close to the uniform distribution overMλ. The claim follows.
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Combining Claim 16.7 together with Eqs. (16.5) and (16.6) yields that:
Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
≥ (1/µ′) ·
 Pr
α∗,c
 Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗(
α∗,Dec(pp, α∗, c)
) ∈ R′
− 2−(1+η)λ

= (1/µ′) ·
2−λ · Pr
c
Adv(pp, c) outputs α s.t.(
α,Dec(pp, α, c)
) ∈ R′
− 2−(1+η)λ

= (2−λ/µ′) ·
Pr
c
Adv(pp, c) outputs α s.t.(
α,Dec(pp, α, c)
) ∈ R′
− 2−ηλ

(16.7)
This concludes the proof of Proposition 16.6.
Using Proposition 16.6 and Eq. (16.4) we obtain that:
Pr
pp
α∗
β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Enc(pp,α∗,β∗)
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
= Epp
 Prα∗
β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Enc(pp,α∗,β∗)
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]
≥ 1/4 · Epp
 Pr
α∗,β∗ s.t (α∗,β∗)∈R′
c←Cpp s.t. Dec(pp,α∗,c)=β∗
[
Adv(pp, c) outputs α∗
]− 2−(1+η)λ
≥ 1
4 · 2λ · µ′ · Epp
[
Pr
c
[
Adv(pp,c) outputs α s.t.(
α,Dec(pp,α,c)
)
∈R′
]
− 2−ηλ
]
− 2−(1+η)λ
=
1
4 · 2λ · µ′ ·
(
Pr
pp,c
[
Adv(pp,c) outputs α s.t.(
α,Dec(pp,α,c)
)
∈R′
]
− 2−ηλ
)
− 2−(1+η)λ
≥ ν
8 · 2λ · µ′
= ω
(
poly(λ)
2λ
)
.
Thus, Adv breaks KDM security with probability ε ≥ (1/negl) · 2−λ, in contradiction to
our assumption.
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16.3 Candidate KDM-secure encryptions with universal ciphertext
We present two encryption schemes that satisfy the ciphertext universality, and plausibly
satisfy -KDM security for exponentially small .
Discrete-log based We first present the encryption scheme based on a generic mul-
tiplicative group, and then specify its instantiation over the elliptic curve groups. The
scheme can be viewed as a bit-encryption variant of ElGamal.
Construction 16.8. Fix a small constant η > 0 (e.g. η = 0.01). Let the message space be
M = {Mλ}λ∈N, where Mλ = {0, 1}w(λ) and w = w(λ) ∈ N. We construct an encryption
scheme as follows.
• Public parameters Generation PP-Gen(1λ): the key-generation algorithm selects a
prime N = N(λ) ≥ 2(1+2η)λ, a group G = G(λ) of size N , and a generator g (the
exact algorithm for determining these depends on the specific group family we use -
see instantiations below).
Let ext : G → {0, 1} be a deterministic efficiently computable function that outputs
0 on dN/2e of the group elements, and 1 on the remaining bN/2c elements.
The public-parameters pp include a concise1 description of the group G, generator g,
and function ext.
• Encrypt Enc(pp, k, y): We view k as an integer in [2λ]. Let y1 . . . yw ∈ {0, 1} be the
bit decomposition of y.
For each j ∈ [w], sample aj $← {0, 1, ..., N − 1} and let Aj := gaj . Sample Cj
uniformly from ext−1(yj) and let Bj = Cj · Akj . Output c = (Aj , Bj)j∈[w] as the
ciphertext.
• Decrypt Dec(pp, k, c): Decompose the ciphertext c as (Aj , Bj)j∈[w]. For j ∈ [w], let
Cj = Bj/A
k
j and let the j
th output bit be ext(Cj).
1By concise description of the group, we mean a description of length poly(λ) that allows performing
group operations such as multiplication, inversion, equality testing and sampling random elements.
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Remark 16.9. To ensure the KDM problem is as hard as possible, the group order is set to
be a prime so that not only the discrete-log problem but also the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem is plausibly hard.
Since the group order is a prime, a deterministic function that extracts a bit from the
group cannot be perfectly balanced. So we set the group order to be slightly larger than
2(1+η)λ in order to allow 2−(1+η)λ-statistical distance for the statistical properties.
We first show that the scheme satisfies the universal ciphertext requirement (see Defi-
nition 16.1).
Proposition 16.10. The encryption scheme of Construction 16.8 has universal cipher-
texts.
Proof. The first condition in Definition 16.1 follows from the fact that for a fixed encryption
key k, and random ciphertext ((Aj , Bj))j∈[w], it holds that each Cj = Bj/Akj is uniformly
distributed and so we only need to account for the deviation from ext. Overall we get that
the output is at most 2−(1+η)λ-close to uniform.
The second condition in Def 16.1 can be verified as follows. For every j ∈ [w] and every
possible value of Aj , there are exactly |ext−1(yj)| possible values Bj that Enc can output,
and each of them is equally likely. Therefore, each pair (Aj , Bj) subject to the condition
ext(Bj · Akj ) = wj is equally likely to be output by Enc, and thus the distribution output
by Enc is identical to a random ciphertext for the given plaintext.
As noted above, we need to assume that Construction 16.8 is exponentially KDM secure.
Assumption 16.11 (KDM security for the discrete-log based encryption). Let λ ∈ N,
w(λ) ∈ poly(λ). There exists a family of groups G(λ) (of efficiently computable sizes
N(λ), with efficiently computable generators, efficient group operations, and efficient ext :
G → {0, 1}) such that for all function f : {1, . . . , 2λ} → {0, 1}w (including those that
are not efficiently computable), the following holds. For any polynomial-time adversary
Adv, for a uniformly random k ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}; for each j ∈ [w], sample aj $← {0, 1, ..., N},
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Cj
$← ext−1(f(k)j). The probability that adversary outputs k on input (Aj = gaj , Bj =
gajk · Cj)j∈[w] is smaller than 12λ·negl(λ) , i.e.
Pr
k
$←{1,...,2λ}
for j∈[w], aj $←{0,1,...,N}, Cj $←ext−1(f(k)j)
Aj=g
aj ,Bj=g
ajk·Cj
[
Adv({Aj , Bj}j∈[w]) = k
]
≤ 1
2λ · negl(λ)
Remark 16.12. In Assumption 16.11, if the function f is a constant (i.e. is independent
of the key), the problem can be reduced from the discrete-log problem over G with the key
restricted to
{
1, . . . , 2λ
}
, i.e. computing k ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ} given g, gk ∈ G. In the reduction,
the discrete-log attacker, given g, gk, and f , can sample (Aj , Bj)j∈[w] from the correct
distribution, send over to the adversary in Assumption 16.11.
Remark 16.13. We chose bit encryption for simplicity of notation. Instead of representing
messages as bits, we can represent them in any base b, as long as there is an efficient and
nearly-regular map ext from G to {0, . . . , b− 1}. The regularity requirement, however, is
quite strong: because of the first requirement in Def 16.1, the preimage size of every digit
under ext must be very close to the average, so that the statistical distance between ext(G)
and uniform is 2−(1+2η)λ.
We can use seeded extractors and put the seed in the public parameters. Specifically,
if we choose N to be at least 22(1+2η)λ · b and ext : G → [b] to be a pairwise independent
hash function, then for the average seed, by the leftover hash lemma [73, Lemma 4.8],
the output will be
√|G|/b = 2−(1+2η)λ-close to uniform. This ensures that a good seed
exists (nonconstructively). If want to make sure the average seed is good with all but
exponential probability, we can choose N to be at least 24(1+2η)λ · b instead. Then for the
average seed, the output will be
√|G|/b = 2−2(1+2η)λ-close to uniform, and therefore for
all but a 1 − 2−(1+2η)λ fraction of the seeds, it will be at least 2−(1+2η)λ-close to uniform,
as required.
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An instantiation over elliptic curves groups. The group G and the extraction func-
tion ext are chosen such that they avoid the known weakness instances of the underlying
ECDLP, and at the same time enjoy the statistical properties.
An elliptic curve group E(Fq) is represent by the curve E (in the short Weierstrass
form) over finite field Fq: E(Fq) =
{
(x, y) | y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod q } ∪ O. Choose the
curve (namely, choose a, b and q) so that q is an odd prime, the order of the group #E(Fq)
is a prime N > 2(1+2η)λ.
In the short Weierstrass form, if (x, y) ∈ E(Fq), then (x,−y) ∈ E(Fq). Any point P
whose y-coordinate is zero does not exist in a prime order group, since P = (x, 0) implies
the order of P is 2. So one option of the extraction function ext : E(Fq) → {0, 1} is
to take the sign of the y-coordinate of a point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fq). To be precise, if
y ∈ {1, ..., (q − 1)/2}, output 1; if y ∈ {(q + 1)/2, ..., q − 1}, output 0. As an exception, if
P = O, output 0.
LWE based The LWE based encryption scheme is a variant of Regev’s scheme [91].
We remark that the hash function obtained by applying Construction 16.3 on Construc-
tion 16.14 yields a variant of Ajtai’s hash function [2], in the sense that we apply rounding
on the output vector.
Construction 16.14. The message space is M = {Mλ}λ∈N, where Mλ = {0, 1}w(λ) and
w = w(λ) ∈ N. We construct an encryption scheme as follows.
• Public parameters generation PP-Gen(1λ): Fix an even number q(λ) as the
modulus. Select B(λ), `(λ) ∈ N such that B` ∈ [2λ−log(λ), 2λ+log(λ)] and B ≤ q. The
public-parameters pp are (B, q, `).
• Representation of the secret key: we view the secret key k ∈ {0, 1}λ as a vector
k ∈ {0, ..., B(λ)− 1}`(λ), written as a column vector.
• Encryption Enc(pp,k, y): Given a message y ∈ {0, 1}w. For j ∈ [w], sample aj $←
Z1×`q . compute bj = yj · q2 + ej − aj · k (mod q), where ej ← U([0, q/2)∩Z). Output
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c = (aj , bj)j∈[w] as the ciphertext.
• Decryption Dec(pp,k, c): View c as (aj , bj)j∈[w]. For j ∈ [w], let the jth output
bit be bbj + aj · k mod qe2, where b·e2 : Zq → {0, 1} outputs 0 if the input is from
[0, q/2), 1 if the input is from [q/2, q − 1].
The parameters are set according to the following constraints to minimize the adver-
sary’s advantage on the KDM problem, and to guarantee the statistical properties. The
choices of parameters are guided by the reductions from the worst case problems, as well as
the known attacks (e.g. [80, 8, 94, 18, 7]), even though some of the attacks were designed to
achieve non-trivial (sub)exponential running time and do not clearly achieving non-trivial
success probability when running in polynomial time.
1. q is even so that we can get perfect ciphertext-universality.
2. The error term e is sampled uniformly from [0, q/2) ∩ Z, differing from the typical
setting of discrete Gaussian distribution. In particular, q/2 is sufficiently large, even
larger than the typical settings of the norm of the noise.
3. B, `, q are selected so that each coordinate of the secret vector has enough entropy
(i.e. B >
√
n), the vector dimension ` is sufficiently close to λ, B/q is not too
small (i.e. q/B ∈ poly(λ)). One way of setting the parameter is to let q = O(λ3),
B(λ) = 2blog λe, `(λ) =
⌊
λ
blog λe
⌉
.
We first show that the scheme satisfies the universal ciphertext requirement (see Defi-
nition 16.1).
Proposition 16.15. The encryption scheme of Construction 16.14 has universal cipher-
texts.
Proof. The first property (as per Def 16.1.1) follows immediately from the perfect 1-
universality of the decryption function.
The second property (as per Def 16.1.2) can be verified as follows. For j ∈ [w], the
randomness in the encryption includes aj ∈ Z1×`q and the error term ej ∈ Zq. For all
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y∗j ∈ {0, 1} and k∗ ∈ {0, ..., B − 1}`, (bj ,aj) ∈ Zq × Znq is sampled uniformly random
conditioned on bj + aj · k∗ mod q ∈ y∗j · q2 + [0, q/2) ∩ Z. Viewing the equality as a 1-
universal function aj · k∗ mod q ∈ y∗j · q2 + [0, q/2) ∩ Z − bj with key aj , the marginal
distribution of aj is uniform over Z1×`q . Then, ej = bj − y∗j · q2 + aj · k∗ is distributed
uniformly over [0, q/2) ∩ Z.
Assumption 16.16 (KDM security for LWE-based encryption). Let λ ∈ N, w(λ) ∈
poly(λ). For all functions f : {0, ..., B − 1}` → {0, 1}w (including those who are not
efficiently computable). The probably that any polynomial time adversary Adv, given
{aj ,aj · k + ej + fj(k) · q/2}j∈[w] where k
$← {0, ..., B − 1}`, aj $← Z1×`q , ej $← [0, q/2) ∩ Z,
outputs k is smaller than 1
2λ·negl(λ) , i.e.
Pr
k
$←{0,...,B−1}`
aj
$←Z1×`q ,ej $←[0,q/2)∩Z,
bj=aj ·k+ej+fj(k)·q/2, for j∈[w]
[
Adv({aj , bj}j∈[w]) = k
]
≤ 1
2λ · negl(λ)
Remark 16.17. In Assumption 16.16, if the function f is a constant (i.e. is independent
of the key), then the problem is equivalent to search-LWE (for the same distributions of
secret, noise, and public matrices, and the same requirement on the success probability as
described in Assumption 16.16).
Chapter 17
Open Problems
We conclude the dissertation with a few open problems.
Towards defining and constructing private function combiners. In Section 3.4 we
mentioned alternative ways of capturing a private constrained PRF, and indicated that the
view of a “private function combiner” might be able to cover functionalities beyond pseu-
dorandom functions. Formalizing such a notion and proposing constructions are interesting
future directions.
Understand the relation of the two lattice approaches of constructing PCPRFs.
As mentioned in Section 7.5, there are two seemingly different lattice approaches of con-
structing PCPRFs: one is from [35] that uses the framework of GGH15, the other is from
[20, 30] that combines FHE, ABE and plain CPRF. It will be interesting to understand
the connection between these two approaches.
Does a single-key private constrained PRF implies public-key encryption? The
readers are given a PCPRF for all constraints recognizable for polynomial size circuits, with
single-key security. We know two-key secure PCPRF implies iO [35], therefore implies
public-key encryption [93]. The question is: does the existence of a single-key PCPRF
imply the existence of public-key encryption schemes?
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